Of examples and instances, § 1-5. Of the efficiency, and various species, of examples, 6-16. Of examples from the fables of the poets, 17, 18. From the fables of Aesop, and proverbs, 19-21. Comparison, 22-25. Caution necessary with respect to it, 26-29. Too much subdivision in it, 30, 31. Comparison of points of law, 32, 33. Analogy, 34, 35. Authority, 36-41. Authority of the gods, 42. Of the judge, and of the adverse party, 43. Examples and authority not to be numbered among inartificial proof, 44. 1. THE third sort of proofs, which are introduced into causes from without, the Greeks call παραδείγματα (paradeigmata), a term which they apply to all kinds of comparison of like with like, and especially to examples that rest on the authority of history. Our rhetoricians, for the most part, have preferred to give the name of "comparison" to that which the Greek calls παραβολή (parabolē), and to render παράδείγμα (paradeigma) by "example." Example, however, partakes of comparison, and comparison of example. 2. For myself, that I may the better explain my object, let me include both under the word παράδείγμα (paradeigma), and translate it by "example." Nor do I fear that in this respect I may be thought at variance with Cicero, though he distinguishes comparison from example, for he divides all argumentation into two parts, induction and reasoning, as most of the Greeks divide it into παραδείγματα (paradeigmata) and έπιχειρήματα (epicheirēmata), and call the παράδείγμα (paradeigma) "rhetorical induction." 3. Indeed the mode of argument which Socrates chiefly used was of this nature, for when he had asked a number of questions to which his adversary was obliged to reply in the affirmative, he at last inferred the point about which the question was raised and to which his antagonist had already admitted something similar; this method was induction. This cannot be done in a regular speech, but what is asked in conversation is assumed in a speech. 4. Suppose that a question of this kind be put: "What is the most noble fruit? Is it not that which is the best?" This will at once be granted. "And which is the most noble horse? Is it not that which is the best?" This, and perhaps more questions to the same effect, will readily be admitted. Last of all will be asked the question with a view to which the others were put. "And among men who is the most noble? Is it not he who is the best?" and this may also be allowed. 5. This mode of interrogation is of great effect in questioning witnesses, but in a continuous speech there is a difference, for there the orator replies to himself: "What fruit is the most noble? The best, I should suppose. What horse? That surely which is the swiftest. And thus he is the best of men, who excels most, not in nobleness of birth but in merit." Therefore, all arguments of this kind must either be from things similar, dissimilar, or contrary. Similitudes are sometimes sought, merely for the embellishment of speech, but I will speak on that subject when the progress of my work requires me to do so; at present I am to pursue what relates to proof. 6. Of all descriptions of proof, the most efficacious is that which we properly term example, that is, the adducing of some historical or supposed fact intended to convince the hearer of that which we desire to impress upon him. We must consider, therefore, whether such fact is completely similar to what we wish to illustrate, or only partly so, that we may either adopt the whole of it or only such portion as may serve our purpose. It is a similitude when we say, "Saturninus was justly killed, as were the Gracchi"; 7. a dissimilitude, when we say, "Brutus put his children to death for forming traitorous designs on their country; Manlius punished the valor of his son with death"; a contrariety, when we say, "Marcellus restored the ornaments of their city to the Syracusans, who were our enemies; Verres took away like ornaments from our allies." Proof in eulogy and censure has the same three varieties. 8. In regard also to matters of which we may speak as likely to happen, exhortation drawn from similar occurrences is of great effect. For example, on remarking that "Dionysius requested guards for his person in order that he, with the aid of their arms, might make himself tyrant," a person should support his remark with the example that "Pisistratus secured absolute power in the same manner." 9. But as some examples are wholly similar, such as the last which I gave, so there are others by which an argument for the less is drawn from the greater, or an argument for the greater from the less. "For the violation of the marriage-bed, cities have been destroyed; what punishment is proper to be inflicted on an adulterer?" or "Flute-players, when they have retired from the city, have been publicly recalled; and how much more ought eminent men of the city, who have deserved well of their country and who have withdrawn from popular odium, to be brought back from exile?" 10. But unequal comparisons are of most effect in exhortation. Courage is more deserving of admiration in a woman than in a man, and, therefore, if a person is to be excited to a deed of valor, the examples of Horatius and Torquatus will not have so much influence over him as that of the woman by whose hand Pyrrhus was killed, and to nerve a man to die, the deaths of Cato and Scipio will not be so efficient as that of Lueretia, though these are arguments from the greater to the less. 11. Let me then set before my reader examples of each of these kinds, extracted from Cicero, for from whom can I adduce better? An example of the similar is the following from the speech for Muraena: "For it happened to myself, that I stood candidate with two patricians, the one the most abandoned, and the other the most virtuous and excellent of mankind; yet in dignity I was superior to Catiline, and in infuence to Galba." 12. An argument from the greater to the less is found in the speech for Milo: "They deny that it is lawful for him, who confesses that he has killed a human being, to behold the light of day; but in what city is it, I ask, that these most foolish of men thus argue? In that city, assuredly, which saw the first trial in it for a capital offense in the case of the brave Horatius, who, though the state was not then made free, was nevertheless acquitted in a public assembly of the Roman people, even though he confessed that he had killed his sister with his own hand." Another from the less to the greater is found in the same speech: "I killed not Spurius Maelius, who, because, by lowering the price of corn and by lavishing his patrimony, he appeared to court the populace too much, incurred the suspicion of aspiring to royalty, etc., but him (for Milo would dare to avow the act when he had freed his country from peril), whose shameless licentiousness was carried even to the couches of the gods, etc.," with the whole of the invective against Clodius. 13. Arguments from dissimilar things have many sources, for they depend on kind, manner, time, place, and other circumstances, by the aid of which Cicero overthrows nearly all the previous judgments that appeared to have been formed against Cluentius, while, by an example of contrast, he attacks at the same time the animadversion of the censors, extolling the conduct of Scipio Africanus who, when censor, had allowed a knight whom he had publicly pronounced to have formally committed perjury, to retain his horse, because no one appeared to accuse him, though he himself offered to bear witness to his guilt if any one thought proper to deny it. These examples I do not cite in the words of Cicero only because they are too long. 14. But there is a short example of contrast in Virgil. At non ille, satum quo te mentiris, Achilles, Not he, whose son thou falsely call'st thyself 15. Instances taken from history we may sometimes relate in full, as Cicero in his speech for Milo. When a military tribune in the army of Caius Marius, a relative of that general, offered dishonorable treatment to a soldier, he was killed by the soldier whom he had thus insulted, for being a youth of proper feeling, he chose rather to risk his life than to suffer dishonor, and that eminent commander accounted him blameless and inflicted no punishment on him. 16. To other instances it will be sufficient to allude, as Cicero in the same speech: "For neither could Servilius Ahala, or Publius Nasica, or Lucius Opimius, or the senate during my consulship, have been considered otherwise than criminal, if it be unlawful for wicked men to be put to death." Such examples will be introduced at greater or lesser length, according as they are more or less known, or as the interest or embellishment of the subject may require. 17. The same is the case with regard to examples taken from fictions of the poets, except that less weight will be attributed to them. How we ought to treat them, the same excellent author and master of eloquence instructs us; 18. for an example of this kind also will be found in the speech already cited: "Learned men, therefore, judges, have not without reason preserved the tradition, in fictitious narratives, that he who had killed his mother for the sake of avenging his father, was acquitted, when the opinions of men were divided, by the voice not only of a divinity, but of the divinity of Wisdom herself." 19. Those moral fables, too, which, though they were not the invention of Aesop (for Hesiod appears to have been the original inventor of them), are most frequently mentioned under the name of Aesop, are adapted to attract the minds, especially of rustic and illiterate people, who listen less suspiciously than others to fictions and, charmed by the pleasure which they find in them, put faith in that which delights them. 20. Thus, Menenius Agrippa is said to have reconciled the people to the senators by that well-known fable about the members of the human body revolting against the belly; and Horace, even in a regular poem, has not thought the use of this kind of fable to be disdained, as in the verses, Quod dixit vulpes aegroto cauta leoni, etc. To the sick lion what the wily fox observed, etc. The Greeks called this kind of composition αἰνος (ainos), "tales"; αἰσωπείος λόγος (Aesopeios ainos), "Aesop's fables," as I remarked; and λιβυκός (libukos), "Libyan fables." Some of our writers have given it the turn apologatio, or "apologue," which has not been received into general use. 21. Similar to this is that sort of παροιμία (paroimia), "proverb," which is, as it were, a shorter fable and is understood allegorically, as a person may say, Non nostrum onus; bos clitellas: "The burden is not mine; the ox, as they say, is carrying the panniers." 22. Next to example, comparison is of the greatest effect, especially that which is made between things nearly equal, without any mixture of metaphor: "As those who have been accustomed to receive money in the Campus Martius are generally most adverse to those candidates whose money they suppose to be withheld, so judges of a similar disposition came to the tribunal with a hostile feeling towards the defendant." 23. Παραβολή (Parabolē), which Cicero calls "comparison," frequently brings things less obvious into assimilation. Nor is it only like proceedings of men that are compared by this figure (as in the comparison which Cicero makes in his speech for Muraena, "If those who have already come off the sea into harbor are accustomed to warn, with the greatest solicitude, those who are setting sail from the harbor, in regard to storms, pirates, and coasts, because nature inspires us with kindly feelings towards those who are entering on the same dangers through which we have passed, how, let me ask you, must I, who just see land after long tossing on the waves, feel affected towards him by whom I see that the greatest tempests must be encountered?"), but similitudes of this kind are also taken from dumb animals and even from inanimate objects. 24. Since, too, the appearance of like objects is different in different aspects, I ought to admonish the learner that that species of comparison which the Greeks call εἲκων (eikōn) and by which the very image of things or persons is represented (as Cassius says, for instance, "Who is that making such grimaces, like those of an old man with his feet wrapped in wool?") is more rare in oratory than that by which we enforce is rendered more credible. For example, if you should say that the mind ought to be cultivated, you would compare it with land, which, if neglected, produces briars and thorns, but when tilled, supplies us with fruit. Or, if you would exhort men to engage in the service of the state, you should show that even bees and ants, animals not only mute but extremely diminutive, labor nevertheless in common. 25. Of this kind is the following comparison of Cicero: "As our bodies can make no use of their several parts—the nerves, or the blood, or the limbs—without the aid of a mind, so is a state powerless without laws." But as he borrows this comparison from the human body in his speech for Cluentius, so, in that for Cornelius, he adopts one from horses, and in that for Archias, one from stones. 26. As I said, the following are more ready to present themselves: "As rowers are inefficient without a steersman, so are soldiers without a general." But the appearance of similitude is apt to mislead us, and judgment is accordingly to be employed in the use of it, for we must not say that "as a new ship is more serviceable than an old one, so it is with friendship," nor that "as the woman is to be commended who is liberal of her money to many, so she is to be commended who is liberal of her beauty to many." The allusions to age and liberality have a similarity in these examples, but it is one thing to be liberal of money, and another to be reckless of chastity. 27. We must therefore consider, above all things, in this kind of illustration, whether what we apply is a proper comparison, just as in the Socratic mode of questioning, of which I spoke a little above, we must take care that we do not answer rashly. Xenophon's wife, in the Dialogues of Aeschines Socraticus, makes inconsiderate replies to Aspasia, 28. a passage which Cicero translates thus:
29. At this question the woman blushed, and not without reason, for she had answered incautiously, at first, in saying that she would rather have her neighbor's gold than her own, as covetousness is unjustifiable. But if she had answered that she would prefer her own gold to be like the better gold of her neighbor, she might then have answered, consistently with modesty, that she would prefer her husband to be like the better husband of her neighbor. 30. I know that some writers have, with useless diligence, distinguished comparison into several almost imperceptibly different kinds and have said that there is a minor similitude, as that of an ape to a man, or that of imperfectly formed statues to their originals, and a greater similitude, as an egg, we say, is not so like an ege, as etc., and that there is also similitude in things unlike, as in an ant and an elephant in genus, both being animals, and dissimilitude in things that are like, as whelps are unlike to dogs and kids to goats, for they differ in age. 31. They say, too, that there are different kinds of contraries, such as an opposite, as night to day; such as are hurtful, as cold water to fever; such as are repugnant, as truth to falsehood; and such as are negatively opposed, as hard things to those which are not hard. But I do not see that such distinctions have any great concern with my present subject. 32. It is more to our purpose to observe that arguments are drawn from similar, opposite, and dissimilar points of law. From similar, as Cicero shows, in his Topics, that "the heir to whom the possession of a house for his life has been bequeathed will not rebuild it if it falls down, because he would not replace a slave if he should die." From opposite points, as, "There is no reason why there should not be a valid marriage between parties who unite with mutual consent, even if no contract has been signed, for it would be to no purpose that a contract had been signed, if it should be proved that there was no consent to the marriage." 33. From dissimilar points, as in the speech of Cicero for Caecina, "Since, if any one had compelled me to quit my house by force, I should have ground for an action against him, shall I have no ground for action if a man prevents me by force from entering it?" Dissimilar points may be thus stated: "If a man who has bequeathed another all his silver may be considered to have left him all his coined silver, it is not on that account to be supposed that he intended all that was on his books to be given to him." 34. Some have separated analogy from similitude; I consider it comprehended in similitude. For when we say, "As one is to ten, so are ten to a hundred," there is a similitude, as much as there is when we say, "As is an enemy, so is a bad citizen." But arguments from similitude are carried still further, as, "If a connection with a male slave is disgraceful to a mistress, a connection with a female slave is disgraceful to a master. If pleasure is the chief object of brutes, it may also be that of men." 35. But an argument from what is dissimilar in the cases very easily meets such propositions: "It is not the same thing for a master to form a connection with a female slave as for a mistress to form one with a male slave," or from what is contrary: "Because it is the chief object of brutes, it should, for that very reason, not be the chief object of rational beings." 36. Among external supports for a cause are also to be numbered authorities. Those who follow the Greeks, by whom they are termed κρίσεις (kriseis), call them judicia or judicationes, "judgments" or "adjudications," not on matters on which a judicial sentence has been pronounced (for such matters must be considered as precedents), but on whatever can be adduced as expressing the opinions of nations or people, or of wise men, eminent political characters, or illustrious poets. 37. Nor will even common sayings, established by popular belief, be without their use in this way, for they are a kind of testimony and are so much the stronger, as they are not invented to serve particular cases, but have been said and confirmed by minds free from hatred or partiality, merely because they appeared most agreeable to virtue and truth. 38. If I speak of the calamities of life, will I not be supported by the opinion of those nations who witness births with tears, and deaths with joy? Or if I recommend mercy to a judge, will it not support my application to observe that the eminently wise nation of the Athenians regarded mercy not as a mere affection of the mind, but as a deity? 39. As for the precepts of the seven wise men, do we not consider them as so many rules of life? If an adulteress is accused of poisoning, does she not seem already condemned by the sentence of Cato, who said that every adulteress was also ready to become a poisoner? With maxims from the poets, not only the compositions of orators are filled but the books also of philosophers who, though they think everything else inferior to their own teaching and writings, have yet not disdained to seek authority from great numbers of verses. 40. Nor is it a mean example of the influence of poetry that when the Megareans and Athenians contended for the possession of the isle of Salamis, the Megareans were overcome by the Athenians on the authority of a verse of Homer (which, however, is not found in every edition), signifying that Ajax united his ships with those of the Athenians. 41. Sayings, too, which have been generally received, become as it were common property for the very reason that they have no certain author, such as "Where there are friends, there is wealth"; "Conscience is instead of a thousand witnesses"; and, as Cicero has it, "Like people, as it is in the old proverb, generally join themselves with like." Such sayings, indeed, should not have endured from time immemorial had they not been thought true by everybody. 42. By some writers, the authority of the gods, as given in oracles, is specified under this head and placed, indeed, in the first rank, for instance, the oracle that "Socrates was the wisest of men." To this, an allusion is rarely made, though Cicero appeals to it in his speech De Aruspicum responsis, and in his oration against Catiline, when he points the attention of the people to the statue of Jupiter placed upon the column, and in pleading for Ligarius when he allows that the cause of Caesar is the better, as the gods have given judgment to that effect. Such attestations, when they are peculiarly inherent in the cause, are called "divine testimonies," when they are adduced from without, "arguments." 43. Sometimes, too, we may have an opportunity of availing ourselves of a saying or act of the judge, or of our adversary, or of the advocate that pleads against us, to support the credit of what we assert. Hence, there have been some that have placed examples and authorities in the number of inartificial proofs, as the orator does not invent them, but merely adopts them. 44. But there is a great difference, for witnesses, examinations, and like matters decide on the subject that is before the judges, while arguments from without, unless they are made of avail by the ingenuity of the pleader to support his allegations, have no force.
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