How far we may use doubtful grounds of argument, § 1-3. Some arguments to be urged in a body, some singly 4, 5. Some to be carefully supported, and referred to particular points in our case 6, 7. Not to be too numerous, 8. Arguments from the characters of persons, 9-13. In what order arguments should be advanced, 14. Quintilian states summarily what others have given at greater length, 15-17. Argument too much neglected in the exercises of the schools, 17-23. 1. SUCH are the notions, for the most part, which I have hitherto held concerning proof, either as conveyed to me by others or as gathered from my own experience. I have not the presumption to intimate that what I have said on the subject is all that can be said; on the contrary, I exhort the student to search after me and allow the possibility of more being discovered, but whatever is added will be pretty much the same with what I have stated. I will now subjoin a few remarks on the mode in which we must make use of proofs. 2. It is generally laid down as a principle that a proof must be something certain, for how can what is doubtful be proved by what is doubtful? Yet some things, which we allege in proof of something else, require proof themselves. "You killed your husband, for you were an adulteress." Here we must bring proof as to the adultery, that when that point appears to be established, it may become a proof of the other which is doubtful. "Your weapon was found in the body of the murdered man; the accused denies that the weapon is his and we must establish this circumstance in order to prove the charge." 3. But it is one of the admonitions necessary to be given here that no proofs are stronger than those which have been shown to be certain after having appeared to be doubtful. "You committed the murder, for you had your apparel stained with blood." Here the allegation that his apparel was stained with blood is not so strong an argument against the accused if he admits it, as if he denies it and it is proved, for if he admits it, his apparel may have been stained with blood from many causes, but if he denies it, he hinges his cause on that very point. If he is convicted on that point, he can make no stand on anything that follows, since it will be thought that he would not have had recourse to falsehood to deny the fact, if he had not despaired of justifying himself if he admitted it. 4. We must insist on the strongest of our arguments singly; the weaker must be advanced in a body, for the former kind, which are strong in themselves, we must not obscure by surrounding matter, but take care that they may appear exactly as they are. The other sort, which are naturally weak, will support themselves by mutual aid, and, therefore, if they cannot prevail from being strong, they will prevail from being numerous as the object of all is to establish the same point. 5. Thus, if any person should accuse another of having killed a man for the sake of his property and should say, "You expected to succeed to the inheritance, and a large inheritance it was; you were poor and were greatly harassed by your creditors; and you had offended him to whom you were heir and knew that he intended to alter his will." The allegations, considered separately, have little weight and nothing peculiar, but brought forward in a body, they produce a damaging effect, if not with the force of a thunderbolt, at least with that of a shower of hail. 6. For some arguments, it is not sufficient merely to advance them; they must be supported, as if you say that "covetousness was the cause of a crime," you must show how great the influence of covetousness is," or if you say "anger," you must observe how much power that passion has over the minds of men. Thus the arguments will be both stronger in themselves and will appear with more grace from not presenting, as it were, their limbs unapparelled or denuded of flesh. 7. If, again, we rest a charge upon a motive of hatred, it will be of importance to show whether it arose from envy, from injury, or from ambition; whether it was old or recent; and whether it was entertained towards an inferior, an equal, or a superior, a stranger or a relative. All such circumstances require peculiar consideration and must be turned to the advantage of the side which we defend. 8. Yet we must not load a judge with all the arguments that we can invent, for such an accumulation would both tire his patience and excite his mistrust, since he can hardly suppose those proofs sufficiently valid which we ourselves, who offer them, seem to regard as unsatisfactory. On the other hand, to argue in support of a matter that is clear is as foolish as to bring a common taper into the brightest sunshine. 9. To these kinds of proof some add those which the Greeks call παθητικάς (pathētikas), "pathetic," drawn from the feelings, and Aristotle indeed, thinks that the most powerful argument on the part of him who speaks is that he be a good man, and as this will have the best effect, so to seem good ranks next to it, though far below it 10. Hence that noble defense of Scaurus: "Quintus Varius of Sacro says that Aemilius Scaurus has betrayed the interests of the people of Rome; Aemilius Scaurus denies it." Iphicrates, too, is said to have justified himself in a similar manner by asking Aristophon, who, as accuser, was charging him with a like offense, "whether he would betray his country on receiving a sum of money." Aristophon replied that he would not, to which Iphicrates rejoined, "Have I, then, done what you would not do?" 11. But we must consider what is the character of the judge before whom we plead and ascertain what is likely to appear most probable to him, a point on which I have spoken both in my directions regarding the exordium and on those regarding deliberative oratory. 12. There is another mode of proof in asseveration: "I did this"; "You told me this"; "O horrible deed!" and the like. Such affirmations ought not to be wanting in any pleading, and if they are wanting, their absence has a very ill effect. They are not to be accounted, however, as great supports, because they may be made on either side, in the same cause, with equal positiveness. 13. Those proofs are stronger which are drawn from the character of a person and have some credible reason to support them, as, "It is not likely that a wounded man, or one whose son has been murdered, would mean to accuse any other than the guilty person, since if he makes a charge against an innocent person, he would let the guilty escape punishment." It is from such reasoning that fathers seek support when they accuse their sons, or others, whoever they may be, that accuse their own relatives. 14. It is also inquired whether the strongest arguments should be placed in front, that they may take forcible possession of the judge's mind, or in the rear, that they may leave an impression upon it, or partly in front and partly the rear, so that, according to Homer's arrangement, the weakest may be in the middle, or whether they should be in a progressive order, commencing with the weakest. But the disposition of the arguments must be such as the nature of the cause requires, a rule, as I think, with only one exception: that our series must not descend from the strongest to the weakest. 15. Contenting myself with giving these brief intimations respecting arguments, I have offered them in such a way as to show, with as much clearness as I could, the topics and heads from which they are derived. Some writers have descanted on them more diffusely, having thought proper to speak of the whole subject of commonplaces and to show in what manner every particular topic may be treated. 16. But to me, such detail appeared superfluous, for it occurs almost to every person what is to be said against envy, or avarice, or a malicious witness, or powerful friends. To speak on all such subjects would be an endless task, as much as if I should undertake to enumerate all the questions, arguments, and opinions in all cases now depending or that will ever arise. 17. I have not the confidence to suppose that I have pointed out all the sources of argument, but I consider that I have specified the greater number. Such specification required the greater care, as the declamations in which we used to exercise ourselves, as military men with foils for the battles of the forum, have for some time past departed from the true resemblance of pleading, and being composed merely to please, are destitute of vigor, there being the same evil practice among declaimers, assuredly, as that which slave dealers adopt, when they try to add to the beauty of young fellows by depriving them of their virility. 18. For as slave dealers regard strength and muscles, and more especially the beard and other distinctions which nature has appropriated to males, as at variance with grace and soften down, as being harsh, whatever would be strong if it were allowed its full growth, so do we cover the manly form of eloquence, and the ability of speaking closely and forcibly, with a certain delicate texture of language, and if our words be but smooth and elegant, we think it of little consequence what vigor they have. 19. But to me, who looks to nature, any man with the full appearance of virility will be more pleasing than a eunuch, nor will divine providence ever be so unfavorable to its own work as to ordain that weakness be numbered among its excellences, nor shall I think that an animal is made beautiful by the knife, which would have been a monster if it had been born in the state to which the knife has reduced it. Let a deceitful resemblance to the female sex serve the purposes of licentiousness, if it will, but licentiousness will never attain such power as to render also honorable that which it has rendered valuable for its own purposes. 20. Regardless of how much audiences, overcome with pleasure, may applaud it, such effeminate eloquence (for I shall speak what I think) will never be worthy of the name of eloquence, for it is language which bears in it not the least indication of manliness or purity, to say nothing of gravity or sanctity, in the speaker. 21. When the most eminent sculptors and painters, if they sought to represent the highest personal beauty in stone or on canvas, never fell into the error of taking a Bagoas or Megabyzus for their model, but choose a young Doryphoru, fitted alike for war or the palaestra, and consider the persons of other warlike youths and athletes truly graceful, shall I who study to form a perfect orator give him, not the arms, but the tinkling cymbals, of eloquence? 22. Let the youth whom I am instructing, therefore, devote himself, as much as he can, to the imitation of truth, and as he is to engage in frequent contests in the forum, let him aspire to victory in the schools and learn to strike at the vital parts of his adversary and to protect his own. Let the preceptor exact such manly exercise above all things and bestow the highest commendation on it when it is displayed, for though youth are enticed by praise to what is faulty, they nevertheless rejoice at being commended for what is right. 23. At present, there is this evil among teachers that they pass over necessary points in silence, and the useful is not numbered among the requisites of eloquence. But these matters have been considered by me in another work and must frequently be noticed in this. I now return to my prescribed course.
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