Of the different names given to arguments among the Greeks and Latins, § 1-8. Various significations of the word argument, 9-11. In every cause there must be something that does not require proof, 12-14. Of credibilities, 15-19. Of sources from which arguments are drawn, 20-22. From the character of individuals, 23-31. From circumstances, as motives, place, time, manner, 32-48. Opportunities and means, 49-52. Arguments from definition, 53-61. Remarks on Cicero's method; argument and definition assisted by division, 62-70. Arguments from commencement, increase, and event, 71, 72. From dissimilitude, opposition, consequentiality, 73-79. From causes and effects, 80-85. From comparison, 86-89. Too many subdivisions under this head, 90-94. Arguments from supposition, 95-99. Precepts not to be followed too superstitiously; examples, 100-108. An orator must take care what he proposes to be proved, an example, 109-118. Utility of rules, 119-121. Necessity and advantages of study and practice, 122-125. 1. I NOW proceed to speak of arguments, for under this term we include all that the Greeks call ἐνθυμήματα (enthymēmata), ἐπιχειρήματα (epicheirēmata), and ἀποδείξεις (apodeixeis), for which, though there is some difference in the names, the meaning is nearly the same. The word enthymema (which we translate, indeed, as we cannot render it otherwise, by commentum, or commentatio, but we had better use the Greek word itself) has three meanings: one, which signifies everything that is conceived in the mind (but with this meaning we have now no concern); another, which signifies a proposition with a reason; 2. a third, which signifies a conclusion of an argument, deduced from consequents or opposites. With regard to this latter sense authors differ, for some call a conclusion from consequents an epicheirema, but more will be found of opinion that a conclusion from opposites only should be called an enthymeme, and hence Cornificius gives it the appellation contrarium. 3. Some have called it a rhetorical syllogism, others an imperfect syllogism, because it is not comprised in distinct parts, or in the same number of parts, as the regular syllogism, such exactness, indeed, not being required in the orator. 4. Valgius calls the epicheirema instead aggressio, "attempt." Celsus thinks that it is not our management of the subject, but the subject itself which we attempt (that is, the argument by which we propose to prove anything, and which, though not yet set forth in words, is fully conceived in the mind) that is called an epicheirema. 5. Others are of opinion that it is not an intended or imperfect proof, but a complete one, proceeding even to the last species, that ought to receive this appellation. Hence its proper acceptation, and that which is most in use, is that in which it is understood to be a certain comprehension of a thought which consists at least of three parts. 6. Some have called an epicheirema a reason, Cicero, more happily, a reasoning, although he seems to have taken that name rather from the syllogism than from anything else, for he calls the status syllogisticus a "ratiocinatory state" and gives examples from the philosophers. As there is some affinity between the syllogism and the epicheirema, he may be thought to have adopted that term judiciously. 7. As to the ἀποδείξεις (apodeixeis), it is an evident proof; and hence the term γραμμικαι ἀποδείξεις (grammikai apodeixeis), "linear demonstrations," among geometers. Caecilius thinks that it differs from the epicheirema only in the manner of its conclusion, and that an apodeixeis is an imperfect epicheirema, for the same reason for which we said an enthymeme differs from a syllogism, for an enthymeme is a part of a syllogism. Some think that the apodeixeis is included in the epicheirema and is the part of it which contains the proof. 8. But authors, however different in other respects, concur in defining both of them so far similarly as to say that the reasoning in them is from that which is certain to give confirmation to that which is doubtful, a quality which is common to all arguments, for what is certain is never deduced from what is uncertain. To all these forms of argument the Greeks give the general name of πίστεις (pisteis), which we might by a literal interpretation render fides, "faith," but we shall make the sense of it clearer if we call it proof. 9. But the word argument has itself also several significations, for the subjects of plays, composed for acting on the stage, are called arguments. Asconius Pedianus, in explaining the topics of the orations of Cicero, says "The argument is this," and Cicero himself, in writing to Brutus, says, "Fearing lest I should bring from thence any evil upon my Cato, though the argument was far from similar, etc." Whence it appears that every subject for writing is so called. 10. Nor is this wonderful, when the word is common even among artisans; Virgil also has argumentum ingens, "a great argument," and a work of any considerable number of heads is vulgarly called argumentosum, "argumentative." But we have now to speak of that sense of the word argument, which includes proof, indication, credibility, and aggression, which are all used as names for the same thing, but, in my opinion, with too little distinction. 11. For proof and credibility are established not only by arguments dependent on reasoning, but by such as are called inartificial. As to signs, which Celsus calls "indications," I have already distinguished them from arguments. Since, then, an argument is a process of reasoning affording a proof, by which one thing is gathered from another, and which establishes what is doubtful by reference to what is certain, there must assuredly be something in a cause that does not require proof. For unless there be something which is true, or which appears true, and from which support may be gained for what is doubtful, there will be no ground on which we can prove anything. 12. As certainties, accordingly, we have, in the first place, what is perceived by the senses, as what we see, what we hear, as signs or indications. Next, we have what is admitted by the general consent of mankind, as, that there are gods, and that respect is to be paid to parents. 13. Also, we have what is established by the laws, or what is passed into general usage, with the concurrence, if not of the whole world, at least of that community or people among whom we have to plead, as indeed, in what is called legal right, most points are settled, not by positive laws, but by common custom. Lastly, there is whatever is agreed between the two parties, whatever is proved, or whatever our adversary does not dispute. 14. For thus will arise an argument, "As the world is governed by a providence, the state ought to be governed by some ruling power," showing that if it is acknowledged that the world is governed by a providence, the state ought likewise to be governed. 15. But to him who would handle arguments properly, the nature and quality of all things whatever ought to be known, as well as their general effects, for it is by such knowledge that arguments called εἰκότα (eikota), "probable," are established. 16. Now of probability there are three degrees: one, which rests on very strong grounds, because that to which it is applied generally happens, as that children are loved by their parents; a second, somewhat more inclined to uncertainty, as that he who is in good health today will live till tomorrow; and a third, which is only not repugnant to credibility, as that a theft committed in a house was committed by one of the household. 17. Hence it is that Aristotle, in his second book on the Art of Rhetoric, has so carefully considered what generally attends on various things and persons, and what things or what persons nature has rendered friendly or unfriendly to other things or other persons: such as what accompanies riches, or ambition, or superstition; what the good approve; what the bad pursue; what soldiers or husbandmen desire; and by what means things are severally shunned or sought. 18. But this subject I do not intend to pursue, for it is not only long, but even impracticable, or rather infinite, and it is plain, moreover, to the common understanding of all. If any one shall desire, however, to be enlightened upon it, I have shown him from whom he may seek instruction. 19. But all probability, on which the far greater part of reasoning depends, flows from sources of this nature, whether it be credible that a father was killed by his son; that a father committed incest with his daughter; and, again, whether poisoning be credible in a step-mother, or adultery in a man of licentious life, also, whether it be credible that a crime was committed in the sight of the whole world, or that false testimony was given for a small bribe. Each of these crimes proceeds from a peculiar cast, as it were, of character—I mean generally, not always, else all reasoning about them would be absolute certainty and not mere probable argument. 20. Let us now examine the places of arguments, although, indeed, the topics of which I have previously spoken are regarded as places of argument by some rhetoricians. By places, I do not mean commonplaces, in the sense in which the word is generally understood, in reference to luxury, adultery, or such subjects, but the seats of arguments in which they lie concealed and from which they must be drawn forth. 21. For as all kinds of fruits are not produced in all countries, and as you will be unable to find a bird or a beast if you are ignorant where it is usually produced or makes its abode, and as among the several kinds of fishes, some delight in a smooth and others in a rocky bottom of the water, while particular sorts are confined to particular regions or coasts, and you could not attract the ellops or the scarus to our shores, so every kind of argument is not to be got from every place and is consequently not everywhere to be sought. 22. Otherwise, there would be much wandering about, and after enduring the utmost labor, we should not be able to find, unless by chance, that for which we should seek without method. But if we ascertain where particular arguments offer themselves, we shall, when we come to the place where they lie, easily discern what is in it. 23. First of all, then, arguments are to be drawn from persons, there being, as I said, a general division of all arguments into two kinds, those which concern things and those which concern persons, the accidents of things being cause, time, place, opportunity, instruments, manner, and the like. As to persons, I do not undertake to treat of every particular concerning them, as most rhetoricians have done, but only of those topics from which arguments may be drawn. 24. These, then, are:
30. They specify also the name among the topics of argument in regard to a person, and the name must certainly be termed an accident of a person, but it is rarely the foundation of any reasoning, unless when it has been given for some cause, as Sapiens, Maqnus, or Plenus, or has suggested some thought to the bearer of it, as Lentulus's name led him to think of joining the conspiracy of Catiline, because dominion was said to be promised by the Sibylline books and the predictions of the soothsayers "to three Cornelii," and he believed himself, as he was a Cornelius, to be the third after Sylla and Cinna. 31. As to the conceit of Euripides, where the brother of Polynices reflects on his name, as an argument of his disposition, it is extremely poor. For jesting, however, occasion is frequently furnished by a name, and Cicero has more than once indulged in it in his pleadings against Verres. Such, and of such a nature, are the common subjects of argument with regard to persons. All I cannot enumerate, either under this head or under others, but content myself with showing the way to those who may inquire farther. 32. I now come to things, among which actions are most closely connected with persons and must therefore be first considered. In regard, then, to everything that is done, the question is either "why," or "where," or "when," or "in what manner," or "by what means," it was done. 33. Arguments are consequently derived from the motives for actions done or to be done. The matter of such motives, which some of the Greek writers call ὕλη (hylē) and others δύναμις (dynamis), they divide into two kinds, subdividing each kind into four species, for the motive for any action is generally connected with the acquisition, the augmentation, the preservation, or the enjoyment, of some good, or the avoidance, diminution, endurance, of some evil, or delivery from it. These are considerations which have great weight in all our deliberations. 34. But right actions have such motives; wrong ones, on the contrary, proceed from false notions, for the origin of them is from the objects which men fancy to be good or evil. Hence arise errors of conduct and corrupt passions, among which may be reckoned anger, envy, hatred, avarice, presumption, ambition, audacity, timidity, and other feelings of a similar nature. Sometimes fortuitous circumstances are added, as drunkenness, or mistake, which sometimes serve to excuse and sometimes to give weight to a charge, as when a man is said to have killed one person while he was lying in wait for another. 35. Motives, moreover, are constantly investigated not only to establish, but to repel accusations, as when an accused person maintains that he acted rightly, that is, from a laudable motive, on which point I have spoken more fully in the third book. 36. Questions of definition, too, sometimes depend upon motives, as whether he is a tyrannicide who killed a tyrant by whom he had been caught in adultery, and whether he is guilty of sacrilege who took down arms suspended in a temple to drive enemies out of his city. 37. Arguments are also drawn from places, for it often concerns the proof of a fact, whether the scene of it was mountainous or level, maritime or inland, planted or uncultivated, frequented or lonely, near or distant, suitable or unsuitable for the alleged purpose, considerations which Cicero treats with very great effect in his defense of Milo. 38. These and similar points most commonly relate to questions of fact, but sometimes also to questions of law, as whether a place be private or public, sacred or profane, our own or belonging to another, as we consider in regard to a person whether he be a magistrate, or a father, or a foreigner. 39. For hence questions arise, as, "You have taken the money of a private individual, but, as you took it from a temple, your crime is not mere theft, but sacrilege"; "You have killed an adulterer, an act which the law allows, but as you committed it in a brothel, it is murder"; and "You have done violence, but as you did it to a magistrate, an action for treason may be brought against you." 40. Or, on the other hand, a person may argue, "I had a right to act in such a way, for I was a father, or I was a magistrate." But it is to be observed that arguments derived from place afford matter for dispute as to questions of fact as well as regarding points of law. Place, too, frequently affects the quality of an action, for the same act is not allowable or becoming in all places alike. It is likewise of consequence before what people a question is tried, for every people has its peculiar customs and laws. 41. Place has also influence in commendation or disparagement, as Ajax says in Ovid, Agimus ante rates causam, et mecum confertur Ulysses? "Do we plead our cause before the ships, and is Ulysses compared with me?" To Milo, too, it was made a subject of reproach, among other things, that Clodius had been killed by him amidst the monuments of his ancestors. 42. Place has influence, moreover, in deliberative oratory, as well as time, some remarks on which I shall subjoin. Of time, as I have already observed in another place, there are two acceptations, since it is viewed either generally or specially. Generally, as when we say, "now, formerly, in the time of Alexander, during the struggle at the siege of Troy," or whatever relates to the present, past, or future. Specially, when we speak of received divisions of time, as "in the summer, in the winter, by day, or by night," or of accidental occurrences at any particular period, as "during a pestilence, in a war, or at a banquet." 43. Some of our Latin authors have thought that sufficient distinction was made if they called time in general merely time, and special portions of it times. To say nothing more on that point, regard to time in both senses is to be had both in deliberative and epideictic, but most frequently in judicial, pleading. 41. For it gives rise to questions of law, determines the quality of actions, and has great influence in questions of fact, since it sometimes offers irrefragable proofs, as if a person should be said (as I supposed above) to have signed a deed when he died before the date of it, or to have done something wrong when he was quite an infant or even not born. 45. Besides, it is to be observed that arguments of all kinds are readily drawn either from circumstances that preceded the fact in question, occurred at the same time with it, or happened after it: Previous circumstances include examples such as "You threatened the deceased with death, you went out at night, you went before him on the road," and motives for deeds, too, relate to time past. 46. Contemporaneous circumstances, which some have distinguished more nicely than was necessary, dividing them into that which is combined with an act, include examples such as "A noise was heard" and those attached to an act, such as "A cry was raised." Subsequent circumstances include examples such as, "You concealed yourself; you fled; and discolorations and swellings appeared on the body." The defendant also will direct his thoughts to the same divisions of time in order to discredit the charge that is brought against him. 47. In these considerations is included all that concern deeds and words, but under two aspects, for some things are done because something else will follow, and others because something else was done before. For example, it is alleged against a man accused of trafficking in women that he bought a beautiful woman who had been found guilty of adultery, or against a rake accused of patricide that he had said to his father, "You shall not reproach me any more." The former is not a trafficker in women because he bought the woman, but he bought her because he was a trafficker in women, and the latter did not kill his father because he uttered those words, but uttered the words because he meditated killing his father. 48. As to fortuitous occurrences, which also afford ground for arguments, they doubtless belong to subsequent time, but are generally distinguished by some peculiarity in the persons whom they concern. For example, I might say, "Scipio was a better general than Hannibal; he defeated Hannibal," or "He was a good pilot; he never suffered shipwreck," or "He was a good husband-man; he raised large crops," or in reference to bad qualities, "He was extravagant; he exhausted his patrimony," or "He lived disgracefully; he was disliked by all." 49. We must also, especially in questions of fact, regard the means of which a party was possessed, for probability inclines us to suppose that a smaller number was killed by a larger, a weaker by a stronger, people asleep by people awake, the unsuspecting by the well prepared. Opposite states of things lead to opposite conclusions. 50. Such points we regard in deliberative speeches, and in judicial pleadings we keep them in view with reference to two considerations: whether a person had the inclination and whether he had the power, for hope depending on power often gives rise to inclination. Hence that conjecture in Cicero: "Clodius lay in wait for Milo, not Milo for Clodius; Clodius was attended with a body of stout slaves, Milo with a party of women; Clodius was travelling on horseback, Milo in a carriage; Clodius was unencumbered, Milo enveloped in a cloak." 51. Under means, also, we may include instruments, for they form part of appliances and resources, and presumptive proofs, too, sometimes arise from instruments, as when a sharp weapon is found sticking in a dead body. 52. To all this is to be added "manner," which the Greeks call τρόπος (tropos), in reference to which the question is, "How a thing was done?" And it has relation both to the quality of an act and to the interpretation of writings, as if we should deny that it is lawful to kill an adulterer with poison and say that he ought to have been killed with a sword. It may concern questions of fact also, as if I should say that a thing was done with a good intention and therefore openly, or with a bad intention and therefore insidiously, in the night and in a lonely place. 53. But in regard to every matter, about the quality or nature of which there is any question, and which we contemplate independently of persons and all else that constitutes a cause, three points are doubtless to be considered: whether it is, what it is, and of what nature it is. But as certain topics of argument are common to all these, the three cannot be divided and must accordingly be introduced under the heads which they respectively happen to fall. 51. Arguments, then, are drawn from definition (ex finitione or fine, for both terms are in use) of which there are two modes, for we either inquire simply whether such a thing is a virtue or, with a definition previously given, what virtue is. Such definition we either express in a general way, as "Rhetoric is the art of speaking well," or with an enumeration of particulars, as "Rhetoric is the art of rightly conceiving, arranging, and expressing our thoughts, with an unfailing memory and with propriety of action." 55. We also define a thing either by its nature, as in the preceding example, or by reference to etymology, as when we derive the sense of assiduus from aes and do, that of locuples from copia locorum, or that of pecuniosus from copia pecorum. To definitions seem especially to belong genus, species, difference, and property. 56. From all these, arguments are deduced. Genus can do little to establish species, but very much to set it aside; what is a tree, therefore, is not necessarily a plane tree, but what is not a tree, is certainly not a plane tree. Nor can that which is not a virtue be justice, and therefore we must proceed from the genus to the ultimate species, as to say, "Man is an animal," is not enough, for "animal" is the genus, and to say that he is "mortal," though it expresses a species, is but a definition common to other animals. But if we say that he is "rational," nothing will be wanting to signify what we wish. 57. On the contrary, species affords a strong proof of genus, but has little power to disprove it, for that which is justice is certainly a virtue, while that which is not justice may be a virtue if it is fortitude, prudence, or temperance. A genus, therefore, will never be disproved by proving a species, unless all the species included under that genus are set aside, as "That which is neither mortal nor immortal is not an animal." 58. To genus and species writers add properties and differences. By properties, a definition is established; by differences, it is overthrown. A property is that which either belongs only to one object, as speech and laughter to man, or belongs to it, but not to it alone, as heat is a property of fire. There may be also many properties of the same thing, as fire, for instance, shines as well as heats. Consequently, whatever property is omitted in a definition will weaken it, but it is not every property introduced in it that will establish it. 59. It is very often a question, too, what is a property of something under consideration. For instance, if it is asserted, on the etymology of the word, "To kill a tyrant constitutes a man a tyrannicide," we may deny it, for if an executioner should kill a tyrant delivered to him to be put to death, he would not be called a tyrannicide, nor would a man be called so that had killed a tyrant unawares or unwillingly. 60. But that which is not a peculiar property will be a difference, as it is one thing to be a slave and another to serve. Hence, there is this distinction with regard to addicti, or insolvent debtors sentenced to serve their creditors: "He who is a slave, if he is set free, becomes a freedman," but this is not the case with an addictus, and there are other points of difference between them of which I shall speak in another place. 61. They call that also a difference, by which, when the genus is distinguished into species, a species itself is particularized, as "Animal" is the genus, "mortal," a species, and "terrestrial" or "two-footed," a difference. We have not yet come to property, though the animal is distinguished from the aquatic or the four-footed, but such distinction belongs not so much to argument as to exact expression of definition. 62. Cicero separates genus and species, which later he calls form, from definition and puts them under relation, as, for example, "if a person to whom all the silver of another person has been bequeathed should claim also the coined silver," he would found his claim upon genus; but "if a person, when a legacy has been left to a woman who should have been a materfamilias to her husband, denies that it ought to be paid to her who never came into her husband's power," he reasons from species, because there are two sorts of marriages. 63. Cicero also shows that definition is assisted by division, which he makes distinct from partition, partition being the distribution of a whole into its parts, division that of a genus into its forms or species. The number of parts, he says, is uncertain, for instance, the parts of which a state consists, but that of forms, certain, as the number of forms of government. We understand these to be three, that with power in the hands of the people, that in the hands of a few, and that in the hands of one. 64. He, indeed, does not use these examples, because, writing to Trebatius, he preferred taking his instances from law. I have given such, as I think, plainer ones. Properties have reference also to questions dependent on conjecture, for as it is the property of a good man to act rightly and of a passionate man to be violent in his languange, it is supposed that he who acts rightly is a good man and that he who is violent in his language is a passionate one, and such as act or speak otherwise are supposed to be of opposite characters. For when certain qualities are not in certain persons, the inference, though from opposite premises, is of a similar nature. 65. Division, in a similar way, serves to prove and to refute. For proof, it is sometimes sufficient to establish one half, as in this example: "A man, to be a citizen, must either have been born a citizen or have been made one," but in refuting you must overthrow both particulars and show that he was neither born nor made a citizen. 66. This mode of reasoning is manifold, and there is a form of argument by successive removals, by which a whole allegation is sometimes proved to be false, and sometimes a portion of it, which is left after successive removals, is shown to be true. A whole allegation is proved to be false in this manner: "You say that you lent this money. Either then you had it of your own, or you received it from some one else, or you found it, or you stole it. If you neither had it of your own, nor received it from any one, nor etc., you did not lend it." 67. What is left is established as true in this way: "This slave, whom you claim as your own, was either born in your house, or bought by you, or given to you, or left to you by will, or captured by you from the enemy—or he belongs to another person"; when it is shown that the suppositions are all unfounded, except the last, it will be clear that the slave belongs to another. This kind of argumentation is dangerous and must be conducted with great wariness, for if we omit one particular in the enumeration, our whole edifice will fall to the ground, to the amusement of our audience. 68. That mode is safer which Cicero uses in his speech for Caecina, when he asks, "If this is not the point in question, what is it?" for thus all other points are set aside at once. That also is safer, in which two contrary propositions are advanced, of which it is sufficient for our purpose to establish either, as in this example from Cicero: "There is certainly no one so unfavorable to Clueutius as not to grant me one thing. If it is certain that those judges were bribed, they must have been bribed either by Habitus or by Oppianicus; if I show that they were not bribed by Habitus, I prove that they were bribed by Oppianicus; if I make it appear that they were bribed by Oppianicus, I clear Habitus from suspicion." 69. Or liberty may be granted to our adversary to choose one of two propositions, of which one must necessarily be true, and, whichsoever he chooses, it may be proved to be adverse to his cause. This is a mode which Cicero adopts in pleading for Oppius: "Whether was it when he was aiming at Cotta, or when he was attempting to kill himself, that the weapon was snatched from his hand?" And in that for Varenus: "The option is granted you, whether you would prefer to say that Varenus took that road by chance or at the instigation and persuasion of the other," and he then shows that either supposition is equally adverse to the accuser. 70. Sometimes two propositions are stated of such a nature that from either, if adopted, the same consequence follows, as in the common adage, "We must philosophize, though we must not philosophize," or in the still more common question, "To what purpose is a figure if the subject is intelligible? To what purpose if it is not intelligible?" And in this saying, "He who can endure pain will tell lies under torture; he who cannot endure pain will tell lies." 71. As there are three parts of time, so the order of things is comprised in three stages of progress, for everything has a beginning, an increase, and a completion. For instance, first there is a quarrel, then one man's blood is shed, then that of several. Here then is an origin for arguments supporting one another, for the end may be inferred from the beginning, as in the common saying, "I cannot expect a toga praetexta when I see the commencement of the web black," or the beginning may be argued from the end, as "the resignation of the dictatorship may be made an argument that Sylla did not take arms with the object of making himself a tyrant." 72. From the increase of a thing, in like manner, arguments may be drawn with regard both to its beginning and its end, and that not only in conjectures as to matters of fact, but in the consideration of points of law, as "Is the end referable to the beginning?" That is, "Ought the blood shed to be imputed to him with whom the quarrel began?" 73. Arguments are also drawn from similarities: "If continence be a virtue, abstinence is also a virtue" and "If a guardian ought to give security, so likewise should an agent." This argument is of the nature of that which the Greeks call ἐπαγωγή (epagōgē), Cicero induction. 72. From dissimilarities: "If joy is a good, pleasure is not therefore necessarily a good" and "What is lawful in regard to a woman is not also lawful in regard to a minor." From contraries: "Frugality is a good, for extravagance is an evil"; "If war is the cause of sufferings, peace will be the remedy of them"; "If he deserves pardon who has done an injury unawares, he does not merit reward who has done a service unawares." 74. From contradictions: "He who is wise is not a fool." From consequences or adjuncts: "If justice is a good, we ought to judge with justice"; If deceit is an evil, we must not deceive," and such propositions may be reversed. Nor are the arguments that follow dissimilar to these, so that they may properly be ranged under the same head, to which, indeed, they naturally belong: "What a man never had he has not lost"; "A person whom we love we shall not knowingly injure"; "For a person whom a man has resolved to make his heir, he has had, has, and will have affection." But as such arguments are incontrovertible, they partake of the nature of necessary indications. 75. The latter sort, however, I call arguments from what is consequent, or what the Greeks call a ἀκόλουθον (akolouthon), as goodness is consequent upon wisdom (what merely follows, that is, happens afterwards, or will be, I would distinguish by the Greek term παρεπόμονον (parepomena).) But about names I am not anxious; every one may use what terms he pleases, provided that the character of the things themselves be understood and that the one be regarded as dependent on time and the other on the nature of things. 16. Accordingly, I do not hesitate to call the following forms of argument consequential (though from what precedes in order of time, they give an indication of what is to follow in order of time) of which some have sought to make two kinds: the first regarding action, as exemplified in Cicero's speech for Oppius: "Those whom he could not lead forth into the province against their will, how could he detain against their will?" The other regards time, as shown in this passage against Verres: "If the Kalends of January put an end to the authority of the praetor's edict, why does not the commencement of its authority bear date from the Kalends of January?" 77. Both of these examples are of such a nature that if you reverse the propositions, they lead to an opposite conclusion, for it is also a necessary consequence that they who could not have been retained against their will could not have been led forth against their will. 78. Those arguments, too, which are drawn from particulars that mutually support each other and which some rhetoricians wish to be deemed of a peculiar kind (they call them ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα (ek ton pros allēla) "out of and toward each other"—correlative ideas; Cicero terms them ex rebus sub eandem rationem venientibus) I would rank with those of necessary consequence, as, "If it is honorable for the Rhodians to let their customs, it is also honorable in Hermocreon to farm them," and, "What it is proper to learn, it is also proper to teach." 79. Of which nature is the happy saying of Domitius Afer, not expressed in this manner, but having a similar effect: "I accused, you condemmed." There is also a kind of argument from two propositions relatively consequent and which proves the same thing from opposite statements, as, "He who says that the world was produced says also that it will come to an end, for everything which is produced comes to an end." 80. Similar to this is the kind of argument by which that which is done is inferred from that which does, or the contrary, which rhetoricians call an argument from causes. Sometimes the consequence necessarily happens, sometimes generally, though not necessarily. Thus a body, for example, casts a shadow in the light, and wherever there is a shadow, it necessarily proves that there is a body. 81. Sometimes, as I said, the consequence is not necessary, whether with reference to the cause and the effect together, or to the cause or effect severally. Thus, "The sun darkens the skin, but it does not necessarily follow that he whose skin is dark has been darkened by the sun." "A road makes a man dusty, but it is not every road that throws up dust, nor does it follow that every man who is dusty has been on a road." 82. Arguments of necessary consequence both from cause and effect are such as these: "If it is wisdom that makes a man good, a good man is necessarily wise," and so, "It is the part of a good man to act uprightly, of a bad man to act dishonorably, and accordingly those who act uprightly are considered good, and those who act dishonorably, bad," and this is a just conclusion. But if we say that "exercise generally makes the body strong," it will not follow that "whoever is strong has taken exercise" or that "whoever has taken exercise is strong," nor "because fortitude secures us from fearing death" will it follow that "whoever does not fear death is to be thought a man of fortitude," nor "if the sun gives men a headache" does it follow that "the sun is not useful to men." 83. The following kind of argument belongs chiefly to the suasory department of oratory: "Virtue confers glory, therefore it is to be followed; pleasure brings infamy, therefore it is to be avoided." 84. But we are judiciously admonished by writers on oratory that causes are not to be sought too far back, as Medea, for example, says in the play "Would that never in the grove of Pelion," as if "the felling of a fir tree to the earth" there had had the effect of producing her misery or guilt, or as Philoctetes says to Paris, "If you had controlled your passion, I should not now be miserable," for retracing causes in this way, we may arrive at any point whatever. 85. To these I should think it ridiculous to add what they call the conjugate argument, had not Ciecro introduced it. An example of it is, "That they who do a just thing do justly," which certainly needs no proof, any more than Quod compascuum est, compascere licere, "On a common pasture it is common to every man to send his cattle to feed." 86. Some call those arguments which I have specified as drawn from causes or efficients by another name, ἐκβάσις (ekbasis), that is, "issues," for nothing is indeed considered in them but how one thing results from another. Arguments called apposite or comparative are such as prove the greater from the less, the less from the greater, or equals from equals. 87. A conjecture about a fact is supported by arguing from something greater, as, "If a man commits sacrilege, he will also commit an ordinary theft"; from something less, as, "He who readily and boldly tells a lie, will commit perjury"; from something equal, as, "He who has taken a bribe to pronounce unjust judgment will also take a bribe to bear false witness." 88. A question about a point of law is supported in a similar way, from something greater, as, "If it is lawful to kill an adulterer, it is also lawful to scourge him"; from something less, as, "If it is lawful to kill a thief in the night, how much more is it lawful to kill an armed robber?"; from something equal, as, "The punishment which is justly pronounced on him who has killed his father is also justly pronounced on him who has killed his mother." All these arguments find a place in causes in which we proceed by syllogism. 89. The following forms are more suitable for questions dependent on definition or quality: "If strength is good for bodies, health is not less so"; "If theft is a crime, much more is sacrilege"; "If abstinence is a virtue, so is continence"; "If the world is ruled by a providence, a state must be directed by a government"; "If a house cannot be built without a plan, what are we to think of the conduct of a fleet or an army?" 90. To me it would be sufficient to notice this form merely as a genus, but it is divided by others into species, for arguments are deduced by them from several things to one, and from one to several (as in the common remark, "What happens once, may happen often"), from a part to the whole, from genus to species, from that which contains to that which is contained, from the more difficult to the easier, from the more remote to the nearer, and from the opposites of all these to their opposites. 91. But such arguments are all of the same nature, for they are drawn from greater things and less, or from things of equal force, and if we pursue such distinctions, there will be no end of particularization, for the comparison of things is infinite, and if we enumerate every kind, we must specify things that are more pleasant, more agreeable, more necessary, more honorable, more useful. But let me abstain from speaking of more, lest I fall into that prolixity which I wish to avoid. 92. As to the examples of this kind of arguments, their number is incalculable, but I will notice only a very few. From the greater, in Cicero's speech for Caecina: "Shall that which alarms armed troops be thought to have caused no alarm in a company of lawyers?" From the easier, in his speech against Clodius and Curio: "Consider whether you could so easily have been made praetor, when he to whom you had given way was not made praetor?" 93. From the more difficult, in his speech for Ligarius: "Observe, I pray you, Tubero, that I, who do not hesitate to speak of my own act, speak boldly of that of Ligarius," and in the same speech, "Has not Ligarius ground for hope, when liberty is granted me to intercede with you even for another?" From the less, in his speech for Caecina: "Is the knowledge that there were armed men a sufficient ground for you to prove that violence was committed, and is the fact of having fallen into their hands insufficient?" 94. To sum up the whole in a few words, then, arguments are drawn from persons, causes, places, time (of which we distinguished three parts: the preceding, the coincident, and the subsequent), manner (that is, how a thing has been done), means (under which we included instruments), definition, genus, species, differences, peculiarities, removal, division, beginning, increase, completion, similaritity, dissimilarity, contraries, consequences, causes, effects, issues, connection, and comparison, each of which is divided into several species. 95. It seems necessary to be added that arguments are deduced not only from acknowledged facts, but from fictions or suppositions, or, as the Greeks say, καθ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν (kat’ hypothesin), "hypothetical," and this kind of arguments is found in all the same forms as the other kinds, because there may be as many species of fictitious as of true arguments. 96. By using fiction, I here mean advancing something which, if it were true, would either solve a question or assist to solve it, and then showing the resemblance of the point supposed to the point under consideration. So that young men who have not yet left school may understand this process better, I will illustrate it by some examples more suitable to that age. 97. The law is that he who does not maintain his parents is to be imprisoned; a man does not maintain his parents, and yet pleads that he ought not to go to prison. He would perhaps have recourse to supposition, "if he were a soldier, if he were an infant, or if he were absent from home on public service." And to oppose the option of a man distinguished for bravery, we might use the supposition, "if he asked for supreme power or for the overthrow of temples." 98. This is a form of argument of great force against the letter of a law. Cicero adopts it in his defense of Caecina: "whence you, or your slaves, or your steward—if your steward alone had driven me out—but if you have not even a single slave but him who drove me out," and there are several other examples in that speech. 99. But the same sort of fiction is of great use in considering the quality of an act: "If Catiline, with the troop of villains that he took with him, could judge of this affair, he would condemn Lucius Muraena." It serves also for amplification: "If this had happened to you at supper over those monstrous cups of yours," and, "If the republic had a voice." 100. These are the common topics of proofs which we find specified and which it is hardly satisfactory to mention under general heads, as a numberless multitude of arguments springs from each of them; nor, on the other hand, does the nature of things allow us to pursue them through all their species, a task for which those who have attempted have incurred the double disadvantage of saying too much and yet not all. 101. Hence most students of rhetoric, when they have fallen into these inexplicable labyrinths, have, as being fettered by the inflexible restrictions of rules, lost all power of action, even that which they ought to have from their own mind and, keeping their eyes fixed on a master, have ceased to follow the guidance of nature. 102. But as it is not sufficient to know that all proofs are to be drawn from persons or from things, because each of these general heads branches out into an infinity of others, so he who shall have learned that arguments are to be deduced from preceding or coincident or subsequent circumstances will not necessarily be qualified to judge what arguments proper for any particular cause are to be deduced from such circumstances. 103. This is especially true because most proofs are taken from what is inherent in the nature of a cause,and have nothing in common with any other cause, and these proofs, while they are the strongest, are also the least obvious because, though we learn from rules what is common to all causes, what is peculiar to any particular cause we have to discover for ourselves. 104. This kind of arguments we may well call arguments from circumstances (as we cannot otherwise express the Greek word περίστασις (peristatis)), or from those things which are proper to any individual cause. Thus in the case of the priest guilty of adultery, who, by virtue of the law by which he had the power of saving a life, wished to save his own life, the argument proper to the cause, in opposing him, would be, "You would not save one criminal only, for if you are released, it will not be lawful to kill the adulteress," for this argument is supplied by the law, which prohibits killing the adulteress without the adulterer. 105. Thus, too, in that controversy in which the law states that bankers might pay half of what they owe, but demand payment of the whole of what was due to them, and that one banker requires the whole of his debt from another banker. The proper argument for the creditor, from the nature of the cause, is, "that it was expressly inserted in the law that a banker might demand the whole of a debt, for with regard to other people, there was no need of a law, as every one had the right of exacting a debt in full except from a banker." 106. But many new considerations present themselves in every kind of subject, and especially in those cases which depend upon writing, because there is often ambiguity, not only in single words, but, still more, in words taken together. 107. These points for consideration must necessarily vary, from the complication of laws and other written documents produced to support or overthrow them, as one fact brings to light another, and one point of law leads to the consideration of another: as, "I owed you no money. Why? You never summoned me for a debt; you took no interest from me; you even borrowed money from me yourself." A law says, "A son who does not defend his father when accused of treason is to be disinherited"; a son denies that he is amenable to this law unless his father be acquitted, and what is his proof? Another law says that "he who is found guilty of treason is to be sent into exile with his defender." 108. Cicero, in his speech for Cluentius, says that Publius Popilius and Tiberius Gutta were found guilty, not of having bribed the judges, but of having tried to bribe them. What is the proof? That their accusers, who were themselves found guilty of trying to bribe, were reinstated, according to law, after having proved Popilius and Gutta guilty of the same offense. 109. But no less care ought to be taken as to what you advance than as to the manner in which what you advance is to be proved. Here the power of invention, if not the greatest, is certainly the first requisite, for as arrows are useless to him who knows not at what he should aim, so arguments are useless to him who has not ascertained to what point they are to be applied. 110. This is what cannot be attained by art, and though several orators, after having studied the same rules, will doubtless use arguments of a similar kind, some will devise more arguments for their purpose than others. Let the following cause, which involves questions by no means common with other causes, be given as an example. 111. "When Alexander had demolished Thebes, he found a document in which it was stated that the Thebans had lent the Thessalians a hundred talents. Of this document Alexander made a present to the Thessalians, as he had had their assistance in the siege. But subsequently, when the Thebans were reestablished by Cassander, they demanded payment of the money from the Thessalians." The cause was pleaded before the Amphictyons. It was admitted that the Thebans had lent a hundred talents and had not been repaid. 112. The whole controversy depends on this point: that Alexander is said to have made the present to the Thessalians. But it is admitted also that no money was given by Alexander to the Thessalians, and it is therefore a question whether that which was given was the same as if he had given them money. 113. Of what profit, then, will grounds of argument be, unless I first settle that the gift of Alexander was of no avail, that he could not give and that he did not give. The commencement of the pleading on the part of the Thebans is at once easy and such as to conciliate favor, as they seek to recover as their right that which was taken from them by force; but then a sharp and vehement dispute arises about the rights of war, the Thessalians alleging that upon those rights depend kingdoms and people, and the boundaries of nations and cities. 114. We have therefore to discover, on the other side, how this cause differs from causes concerning other things that fall into the hands of a conqueror, and the difficulty in this respect lies not so much in the proof as in the proposition to be advanced. We may state in the first place that "in regard to whatever can be brought before a court of justice, the right of war can have no power; that things taken away by arms cannot be retained except by arms; that, consequently, where arms prevail, the judge has no power, and that when the judge has power, arms have none." 115. Such a statement is first to be made that an argument, such as the following, may be brought to support it: "That prisoners of war, if they effect a return into their country, are at once free, because what is taken by force of arms cannot be held except by force of arms." It is peculiar to the cause, also, that the Amphictyons are the judges in it (for, concerning the same question, there is one mode of proceeding before the centumviri and another before a private judge). 116. On the second head, we may allege that the right to the money could not have been given by Alexander to the Thessalians, as right can belong only to him who holds it and, being incorporeal, cannot be grasped by the hand. This is a proposition more difficult to conceive than it is, when you have conceived it, to support it with arguments, such, for example, as the following: "that the condition of an inheritor is different from that of a conqueror, because right passes to the one, and mere property to the other. "117. It is also an argument peculiar to the cause itself that "the right over what was owing to a whole people could not have passed into the hands of the conqueror, because what a whole people had lent, was due to them all, and as long as a single one of them survived, he was a creditor for the whole sum; and that all the Thebans had not fallen into the power of Alexander." 118. This argument, such is its force, is not upheld by external support, but sustains itself by itself. On the third head, the commencement of the argumentation will rest on the more obvious assertion that the right did not lie in the writing, a proposition which may be supported by many confirmations. The intention of Alexander may also be brought into question, and it may be inquired whether he meant to oblige or to deceive the Thessalians. It is likewise an argument peculiar to the cause and the commencement, as it were, of a new discussion, "that the Thebans, even though it be admitted that they lost their right, must be thought to have recovered it by their re-establishment." Under this head may be inquired, too, what were the views of Cassander. But all pleading on behalf of equity had the highest influence with the Amphictyons. 119. I make these observations, not because I think that the knowledge of the general topics from which arguments are drawn is useless (for if I had thought so, I should have given no precepts respecting them), but that those who have studied them may not think themselves, while they neglect other points, complete and consummate masters of their art and may understand that unless they acquire other accomplishments, on which I shall soon give instructions, they will have attained but dumb knowledge. 120. For the power of finding arguments was not a result of the publication of books on rhetoric; all kinds of arguments were conceived before any instruction was given respecting them, and writers afterwards published the forms of them when they were observed and collected. It is a proof of this fact that writers on rhetoric use old examples of argumentation, extracting them from the orators and producing nothing new of their own or anything that has not been said before. 121. The real authors of the art, therefore, are the orators, though certainly some thanks are due to those by whom our labor has been diminished, for the arguments which preceding orators have discovered one after another, by the aid of their natural genius, it is not necessary for us to seek, and yet they are all accurately known to us. But this is not sufficient to make an orator, any more than to have studied in the palaestra is sufficient to make an athlete, unless the body be also strengthened by exercise, continence, food, and, above all, by constitutional vigor; on the other hand, all these advantages are of no avail without the assistance of art. 122. Let students of eloquence consider also that every point to which I have called their attention is not to be found in every cause and that when a subject for discussion is brought before them, they need not search for every topic of argument and knock, as it were, at its door to know whether it will answer and serve to prove what they desire; they need not do this, I say, unless they are still learners and destitute of experience. 123. Such examination, indeed, would render the process of speaking infinitely slow, if it were always necessary to examine the several kinds of arguments and ascertain, by trial, which of them is fit and proper for our purpose. I know not whether all rules for argument would not be a hindrance to us unless a certain penetration of mind, engendered in us by nature and exercised by study, conducted us straight to all the considerations suited to any particular cause. 124. For the accompaniment of a stringed instrument, when joined to the notes of the voice, is a great assistance to it, and yet, if the hand of the player be slow and hesitates to which string each note of the voice corresponds until every string has been sounded and examined, it would be better for the singer to be content with what his unassisted power of voice enables him to accomplish. Thus, too, our system of study ought to be fitted and applied, as it were, after the manner of a stringed instrument, to rules of this nature. 125. But such an effect is not to be produced without great practice in order that, as the hand of the musician, though he be attending to something else, is yet led by habit to produce grave, acute, or intermediate notes, so the variety and number of arguments in a case may not embarrass the judgment of the orator, but may present and offer themselves to his aid, and that as letters and syllables require no meditation on the part of the writer, so reasons may follow the orator as of their own accord.
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