Of the enthymeme and its parts, § 1-4. Of the epicheirema and its parts, 5-9. Not always of the same form, 10-13. The epicheirema of the orators is the syllogism of the philosophers, 14-16. All the parts of it not always necessary to be specified, 17-19. Three modes of opposing this form of argument, 20-23. How the enthymeme differs from the syllogism, 24-26. We must not crowd our speech with rhetorical forms of argument, 27-32. We must not leave our arguments unembellished, 33-35. 1. THE term enthymeme rhetoricians apply not only to the argument itself, that is the matter which is used for the proof of anything else, but to the enunciation of the argument, which they make, as I said, twofold. The first kind is formed from consequents, which consists of a proposition and a proof immediately following it, as in this passage of Cicero's speech for Lijarius: "The cause was then doubtful, because there was something that might be sustained on each side, but now that side must be deemed the stronger to which even the gods have given support." This is an enthymeme, for it contains a proposition and a reason, but no logical conclusion. and is therefore an imperfect syllogism. 2. The other kind is formed from opposites, which some call the only form of enthymeme and in which the proof is much stronger. Such is that in the speech of Cicero for Milo: "You sit, therefore, as avengers of the death of a man to whom you would be unwilling to restore life even if you thought it could be restored by your means." 3. This form is sometimes made to consist of several clauses, of which we have an example by the same orator on behalf of the same client:
4. But the best kind of enthymeme appears to be that in which a reason is subjoined to a proposition dissimilar or opposite, as in this passage of Demosthenes:
5. Of the epicheireman four, five, and even six parts are made by some rhetoricians; Cicero makes at most five: the proposition, or major, with its reason; the assumption, or minor, with its proof; and as the fifth, the conclusion. But as the major has sometimes no need of a reason, and the minor no need of proof, and as there is sometimes, too, no need of a conclusion, he thinks that the epicheirema may at times consist of only four, or three, or even two parts. 6. To me, as well as to the greater number of authors, there appears to be not more than three, for such is the nature of reasoning, that there must be something about which there is a question, and something by which it is to be proved, and a third may be added as resulting from the agreement of the two former. Thus, there will be first the proposition, or major; secondly, the assumption, or minor; and thirdly, the conclusion, for the reason of the first part and the proof of the second may be included in those parts to which they are attached. 7. Let us take, accordingly, an example of the five parts from Cicero: "Those things are better managed which are regulated by some plan than those which are conducted without any fixed design; this," says Cicero, "they call the first part, and think that it ought to be established with various reasons and the most copious eloquence possible." For myself, I consider the whole proposition with its reasons as but one part; else, if the reasoning be called a part, and that reasoning be various, there must necessarily be various parts. 8. He then gives the assumption, or minor: "But of all things nothing is managed better than the whole world; and," he adds, "of this assumption they introduce its proof as a fourth part." But I say the same concerning the assumption as concerning the proposition. 9. He continues:
A third part I accordingly admit. 10. In the three parts, however, which I have made, there is not always the same form. There is one form in which the same is expressed in the conclusion as in the major proposition: "The soul is immortal, for whatever has its motion from itself, is immortal. But the soul has its motion from itself. Therefore the soul is immortal." This form prevails not only in detached arguments, but throughout all causes, such at least as are simple and in the various questions in causes. 11. For all causes and all questions have a first proposition, as, "You have committed sacrilege," and, "It is not every one that has killed a man that is guilty of murder," and attached to this proposition is a reason (which, however, is more expanded in causes and portions of causes than in detached arguments), and lastly, a conclusion, in which they commonly show, either by a full enumeration of particulars or a short recapitulation, what they have established. In this kind of epicheirema the proposition is doubtful, for the question is about the proposition. 12. In another form, the conclusion is not indeed the same as the major proposition, but has the same force: "Death is nothing to us, for what is dissolved into its elements is without consciousness, and that which is without consciousness is nothing to us." In a third form, the proposition is not the same as the conclusion: "All animated things are better than things inanimate. But nothing is better than the world. The world, therefore, is animated." What is here the conclusion might be made the major proposition, for the reasoning might be stated thus: "The world is animated, for all animated things are better than things inanimate." 13. But this major proposition is either an acknowledged truth as in the last example, or requires proof, as, "He who wishes to lead a happy life ought to become a philosopher," this is not universally admitted. and the conclusion cannot be drawn unless the premises be established. The minor proposition, too, is sometimes universally acknowledged, as, "But all wish to live a happy life," and sometimes requires to be proved, as, "What is dissolved into its elements is void of consciousness," for it is uncertain whether the soul, when detached from the body, may not be immortal or exist at least for a certain time. I may observe that what some call the assumption, or minor proposition, others call the reason. 14. But the epicheirema differs in no respect from the syllogism, except that the syllogism has a greater number of forms and infers truth from truth, while the epicheirema is generally employed about probabilities, for if it were always possible to prove what is disputed by what is acknowledged, there would scarcely be any work for the orator in the matter, since what need would there be of superior ability to reason thus: 15. "The property belongs to me, for I am the only son of the deceased," or, "I am the sole heir, since by the laws respecting property, the property of a testator is given to the heir according to the purport of the will, and to me therefore the property belongs." 16. But when the reason given becomes itself a matter of dispute, we must render that certain by which we seek to prove what is uncertain. For instance, if it be said by the adversary, "You are not his son," or, "You are not legitimate," or, "You are not the only son," or, again, "You are not the heir," or, "The will is not valid," or, "You are not capable of inheriting," or, "You have co-heirs," we must establish a just ground on which the property ought to be adjudged to us. 17. But when a long chain of reasoning intervenes, a recapitulatory conclusion is requisite. In other cases, a proposition and reason may often be sufficient: "The laws are silent amidst arms and do not require their sanction to be waited for, when he who would wait for it must suffer an unjust death before a just penalty could be exacted." Hence it has been observed that the form of enthymeme which rests upon consequents is similar to a reason. Sometimes, again, a single proposition is judiciously given alone, without any reason, as that which we just now cited, "The laws are silent amidst arms." 18. We may also commence with the reason and then draw a conclusion, as, in the same speech, "But if the twelve tables allow a thief to be killed with impunity under any circumstances, and a thief in the day if he defend himself with a weapon, who can suppose that in whatever case a man has been killed, he who killed him must suffer punishment?" Cicero has also made some variation in this form and put the reason in the third place: "When he sees that the sword is sometimes put into our hands by the laws themselves." 19. The following sentence, again, takes the form of that which precedes: "But how can death be unjustly inflicted on an ambusher and a robber?" This is the proposition. "What is the object of our escorts, of our weapon?" This is the reason. "Which certainly we should not be allowed to have, if we were under no circumstances to make use of them." This is a conclusion from the proposition and the reason. 20. This mode of argument is refuted in three ways, that is, it is attacked in each of its parts, for the proposition may be combated, or the assumption, or the conclusion, or sometimes all the three. For example, the proposition that "He is justly killed who ambushes to kill" may be combated, for the first question in the defense of Milo is, "Whether he should be allowed to live who confesses that a man has been killed by his hand?" 21. The assumption, or minor proposition, may be assailed by all the arts which I have mentioned in the chapter on refutation. As to the reason, we may observe that it is sometimes true when the proposition to which it is attached is false and that a false reason is sometimes attached to a true proposition. "Virtue is a good," is a true proposition, but if any one add as a reason, "because it makes men rich," a false reason is given for a true proposition. 22. As to the conclusion, it is either denied to be just when it expresses something different from what can be fairly deduced from the premises or is alleged to have nothing to do with the question: "An ambusher is justly put to death, for he who prepared himself to offer violence as an enemy ought also to be repelled as an enemy; Clodius, therefore, as an enemy, was justly put to death." Here, the conclusion is false, for it has not yet been proved that Clodius was an ambusher. 23. On the other hand, it would be a just conclusion to say, "An ambusher, therefore, as an enemy, was justly put to death," but it would be nothing to the purpose, for it had not previously been proved that Clodius was an ambusher. But though the proposition and reason may be true and the conclusion false, if the proposition and reason are false, the conclusion cannot be true. 24. The enthymeme is called by some an oratorical syllogism, by others a part of a syllogism, because the syllogism has always its regular proposition and conclusion and establishes by means of all its parts that which it has proposed, while the enthymeme is satisfied if merely what is stated in it be understood. 25. A syllogism is of this form: "Virtue is the only good, for that only is good of which none can make an ill use. But none can make an ill use of virtue. Therefore virtue is the only good." The enthymeme will consist only of the consequents, "Virtue is a good, because none can make an ill use of it." A negative syllogism will be of this nature: "Money is not a good, for that is not a good of which any one can make a bad use. But any one can make a bad use of money. Therefore money is not a good." Here the enthymeme will consist of the opposites: "Is money a good, when any one can make a bad use of it?" 26. The following sentence has the syllogistic form: "If money, which consists of coined silver, comes under the general term silver, he that bequeathed all his silver bequeathed also his money consisting in coined silver. But he did bequeath all his silver. Therefore he bequeathed also his money consisting of silver." But for an orator it is sufficient to say, "When he bequeathed all his silver, he bequeathed also his money which consists of silver." 27. I think that I have now gone through the mysteries of those who deliver precepts on rhetoric. But judgment must be exercised in applying such directions as I have given. For though I do not think it unlawful to use syllogisms occasionally in a speech, yet I should by no means like it to consist wholly of syllogisms, or to be crowded with a mass of epicheiremata and enthymemes, for it would then resemble the dialogues and disputations of logicians, rather than oratorical pleading, and the two differ widely from one another. 28. Your men of learning, who are seeking for truth among men of learning, examine every point with the utmost minuteness and scrupulosity, with the view of bringing it to clearness and certainty, claiming to themselves the offices of discovering and judging what is right, of which they call the one τοπική (topikē), "the art of finding arguments," and the other κριτική (kritikē), "the power of judging of their soundness." 29. But we orators must compose our speeches to suit the judgment of others and must frequently speak before people altogether uneducated, or at least ignorant of any other literature than what we teach them, and unless we allure them by gratification, attract them by force, and occasionally excite their feelings, we shall never impress upon them what is just and true. 30. Oratory should be rich and brilliant, but it will have neither of those qualities if it be pieced out of regular and frequent syllogisms, expressed almost always in the same form, for it will then incur contempt from appearing mean and aversion from looking servile. If it is copious, it will excite satiety; if it attempts to be swelling, it will meet disdain. 31. Let it hold its course, therefore, not along foot paths, but through open fields; let it not be like subterranean springs confined in narrow channels, but flow like broad rivers through whole valleys, forcing a way wherever it does not find one. For what is a greater misery to speakers than to be slaves to certain rules, like children imitating copies set them, and, as the Greeks proverbially express it, "taking constant care of the coat which their mother has given them?" 32. Must there always be proposition and conclusion from consequents and opposites? Is the speaker not to animate his reasoning, to amplify it, to vary and diversify it with a thousand figures, making his language appear to grow and spring forth naturally, and not to be manufactured, looking suspicious from its art, and showing everywhere the fashioning of the master? What true orator has ever spoke in such a way? In Demosthenes himself, are there not very few traces to be found of such regularity and art? Yet the Greeks of our own day (the only respect in which they act less judiciously than ourselves) bind their thoughts as if they were in chains, connecting them in an inexplicable series, proving what is undisputed, confirming what is admitted, and calling themselves, in these points, imitators of the ancients. But if they are asked whom they imitate, they will never give an answer. 33. Of figures I shall speak in another place. At present, it seems necessary only to add that I do not agree with those who think that arguments are always to be expressed in a pure, lucid, and precise style, but neither copious nor ornate. That they should be precise and perspicuous indeed, I admit, and on matters of little consequence, set forth in plain language and in terms as appropriate and familiar as possible; but if the subject be of a higher nature, I think that no ornament should be withheld from them, provided that it causes no obscurity. 34. For a metaphor often throws a flood of light on a subject, so much so that even lawyers, whose solicitude about the propriety of words is extreme, venture to call litus, '"the sea-shore," the place where the wave eludit, "sports." 35. The more rugged a subject is, too, by nature, the more we must recommend it by charms of expression; argument is less suspected when it is disguised, and to please the hearer contributes greatly to convince him. Otherwise we must pronounce Cicero deserving of censure, for using, in the heat of his argumentation, the metaphorical expressions, "The laws are silent amid arms," and, "The sword is sometimes presented to us by the laws themselves." But moderation must be observed in the use of such figures, that, while they are an embellishment to a subject, they may never be an incumbrance to it.
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