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Book 5 - Chapter 1
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Inartificial proofs. Eloquence not inefficient in regard to them.
1. IN the first place, then, the division which has been laid down by Aristotle has gained the approbation of almost all rhetoricians, namely, that there are some proofs which an orator adopts that are unconnected with the art of speaking and others which he himself extracts and, as it were, produces from his cause. Hence they have called the one sort ἄτεχνοι (atechnoi), "inartificial," and the other ἔντεχνοι (entechnoi), "artificial." 2. Of the former kind are precognitions, public report, evidence extracted by torture, writings, oaths, and the testimony of witnesses, with which the greater part of forensic pleadings are wholly concerned. But though these species of proof are devoid of art in themselves, they yet require, very frequently, to be supported or overthrown with the utmost force of eloquence, and those writers, therefore, appear to me highly deserving of blame who have excluded all this kind of proofs from the rules of art. 3. It is not, however, my intention to collect all that is usually said for and against these points, for I do not design to lay down commonplaces, which would be a task of infinite labor, but merely to point out a general method and plan. The way being shown, each must exert his ability, not only to follow it, but to find out similar courses, as the nature of particular cases may require, since no one can speak of all kinds of causes, even among such as have occurred, to say nothing of such as may occur.
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