Deliberative oratory not confined to questions of utility, § 1. Whether nothing is useful but what is honorable, 2, 3. Deliberative oratory not concerned wholly with the position of quality, 4, 5. What kind of exordium requisite in it, 6-9. Statement of facts, 10, 11. The passions to be moved, 12, 13. Whether it solely concerns affairs of government, 14. That a thing can be done, is either certain or uncertain, 17-21. The three topics of persuasion, 22-26. Some do not distinguish topics from divisions of topics, 27, 28. The pleasing, the useful, and the honorable, 29-35. Use of examples, 36, 37. How things that are honorable may be recommended, and sometimes such as are at variance with honor, 38-47. Authority of the speaker, 48. Prosopopeiae, 49-51. In the schools, deliberative subjects have a great resemblance to controversies, 52-57. An error into which declaimers fall, 58-66. Advantage of reading history, 67-70. 1. I AM surprised, also, that deliberative oratory is confined by some authors wholly to matters of utility. If we ought to follow one sole object in it, the opinion of Cicero would have greater weight with me, who thinks that this department of speaking is chiefly occupied about what is honorable. Nor do I doubt, indeed, that those who adopt the former opinion consider, according to a very noble principle, that nothing is advantageous but what is honorable. 2. This notion would certainly be very just, if the resolutions of the good and wise were always ready to support us. But in addressing the unlearned, to whom our opinions must often be delivered, and especially in haranguing the people, the majority of whom are ignorant, the two must be kept distinct, and we must speak more in conformity with ordinary apprehension. 3. For there are many who, though they may consider an action to be honorable, do not immediately allow it to be sufficiently advantageous and, led by the prospect of advantage, approve what they cannot doubt to be highly dishonorable, as the treaty with the Numantines and the passing under the yoke at the defile of Caudium. 4. Nor is it sufficient to include deliberative oratory in the position of quality, in which is comprised the question of what is honorable and what is useful, for in respect to these, there is often room for conjecture. At times, some definition is to be considered, and occasionally, too, legal inquiries may occur, especially in reference to private proceedings, if ever a doubt arises whether a thing be lawful. Of conjecture I shall speak more fully a little below. 5. As to definition, meanwhile, there is this question in Demosthenes, "Whether Philip should give or restore Halonnesus to the Athenians?" and in Cicero, in his Philippics, "What is a tumult?" Is there not, too, the question, similar to those in judicial causes, about the statue of Servius Sulpicius, "whether statues are to be erected to those only who perish on an embassy by the sword?" 6. The deliberative department of oratory, therefore (which is also called the "suasory"), while it consults concerning the future, inquires also into the past. It has two objects: to persuade and to dissuade. An exordium, such as is usual in judicial pleadings, it does not require, because whoever consults an orator is already well-disposed to hear him. Yet the commencement, whatever it be, ought to have some resemblance to an exordium, for we must not begin abruptly or with whatever we may fancy, because in every subject there is something naturally first. 7. In speaking before the Senate, and, indeed, before the people, the same object is to be kept in view as in addressing judges, namely, that of securing the goodwill of the majority of those to whom we speak. Nor is this to be thought surprising, when the favor of the audience is sought even in panegyrics, where the purpose is not to attain any advantage, but merely to bestow praise. 8. Aristotle, indeed, and not without reason, thinks that we may often commence, in deliberative speeches, with an allusion to ourselves or to the character of him who differs in opinion from us, borrowing this method, as it were, from judicial pleadings. In such a manner, sometimes our subject may be made to appear of less or greater importance than our audience imagine it. 9. In panegyrics, he thinks that the exordium may be allowed the utmost latitude, since it is sometimes taken from something foreign to the subject, as Isocrates has taken his in his oration in praise of Helen, or from something bordering on the subject, as the same orator, in his Panegyric, complains that "more honor is paid to the good qualities of the body than to those of the mind," and as Gorgias, in his oration at the Olympic games, extols those who first instituted such meetings. Sallust, doubtless following the example of these orators, has commenced his histories of the Jugurthine War and the Conspiracy of Catiline with introductions having no relation to his narratives. 10. But I am now to speak of deliberative oratory, in which, even when we adopt an exordium, we ought to content ourselves with one that is short, resembling as it were an initial chapter or statement. As to a regular statement of facts, a private subject of discussion will never require it, at least a statement of the matter on which an opinion is to be given, for no man is ignorant of the particulars on which he consults others. 11. Statements, however, of many external circumstances relative to the subject of deliberation may be introduced. In deliberative addresses to the people, a statement setting forth the order of circumstances is indispensable. 12. Deliberative oratory requires appeals to the feelings more than any other kind of eloquence, for indignation is often to be kindled and allayed, and the minds of the audience are to be moved to fear, eagerness, hatred, or benevolence. Sometimes, too, pity is to be excited, whether we have, for example, to recommend that aid be given to a besieged town, or whether we be called upon to lament the overthrow of a people in alliance with us. 13. But what is of most weight in deliberative speeches is authority in the speaker, for he who desires everybody to trust to his opinion about what is expedient and honorable ought to be, and to be esteemed, a man of the greatest judgment and probity. In judicial pleadings, it is commonly thought allowable for a man to indulge, in some degree, his own feelings, but everyone supposes that counsel is given by a speaker in accordance with his moral principles. 14. Most of the Greek rhetoricians have been of opinion that the business of all this kind of oratory is with addresses to the multitude and have confined it wholly to affairs of government. Even Cicero considers it chiefly with reference to that department and accordingly says that for those who are to give advice concerning peace, war, levies of troops, public works, or revenues, the two things chiefly to be known are the resources and the manners of the people whom they address, so that his arguments may be derived at once from the particular circumstances and from the character of his hearers 15. To me, it appears that there is greater variety in this field of eloquence, for the classes of persons who consult and the kinds of advice that may be given are extremely numerous. In persuading and dissuading, then, three particulars are chiefly to be regarded: what is the subject of deliberation, who are those that deliberate, and what is the character of him that would influence their deliberations. 16. As to that which is the subject of deliberation, it is either certain that it may be carried into effect, or uncertain. If it be uncertain, its uncertainty will be the sole point for consideration, or, I should say, the chief point, for it will often happen that we shall assert, first of all, that a thing, even if it could he done, ought not to be done, and, next, that it cannot be done. But when the question is respecting something uncertain, the point is conjectural: can the Isthmus be cut through, or the Pontine marshes drained, or a harbor made at Ostia, or was Alexander likely to find lands beyond the ocean? 17. But even in regard to things which are acknowledged to be practicable, there will sometimes be room for conjecture: as if it were inquired, for instance, whether it would ever happen that the Romans would subdue Carthage, whether Hannibal would return if Scipio transported his army into Africa, or whether the Samnites would keep faith if the Romans were to lay down their arms. As to some things, too, it is credible both that they can be done and that they will be done, but at some other time, or in some other place, or in some other manner. 18. Where there is no place for conjecture, other points are to be regarded. In the first place, the deliberation will be held either on account of the matter itself, on which opinions are asked, or on account of some extrinsic reasons that affect it. The Senate deliberates, for example, with regard to the matter itself when they consider whether they shall vote pay for the army. 19. This is a simple question. Reasons are adduced for doing a thing, as when the Senate deliberates whether they shall deliver up the Fabii to the Gauls threatening war, or for not doing it, as when Julius Caesar deliberates whether he shall persist in marching into Germany when his soldiers were everywhere making their wills. 20. These two questions offer more than one point for consideration, for as to the former, the reason for deliberating is that the Gauls are threatening war, but a question may also be raised whether even, without such threatening, those ought not to have been given up who, being sent as ambassadors, had engaged in battle contrary to law and had killed the king to whom they had received communications. 21. As to the other subject, Caesar would doubtless not have deliberated at all if it had not been for the consternation of his troops; yet there is room for inquiring whether, independently of that circumstance, it would have been proper for him to proceed into Germany. But we must always speak first on that point which might be a subject for deliberation even if other circumstances were detached from it. 22. Some have thought that the topics for persuasion are the three considerations of what is honorable, what is useful, and what is necessary. For the introduction of the third, I find no motive, for when any force oppresses us, it may be necessary for us to suffer something, but certainly not to do anything; it is about doing that deliberation is concerned. 23. If they call "necessity" that to which men are driven by the fear of some greater evil, the question respecting it will be one of expediency. If the inhabitants of a besieged city, inferior in numbers to the besiegers and in want of water and provisions, deliberate about surrendering to the enemy, and it be said, that "it is necessary" for them to surrender, it must be added, "for otherwise they must be destroyed"; however, if they prefer to submit to destruction, it appears that it is "not necessary" for them to surrender for the very reason that they may be destroyed. In fact, the Saguntines did not surrender nor those who were surrounded in the vessel of Opitergium. 24. In such circumstances, therefore, the question will be either concerning expediency alone, or there will be hesitation between what is expedient and what is honorable. But, it may be said, if a man wishes to have children, he is under the necessity of taking a wife. Doubtless, but he who wishes to have children must first be convinced that he ought to take a wife. 25. Consequently there appears to me to be no place for deliberation when there is necessity, any more than when it is settled that a thing cannot be done, for all deliberation is about something doubtful. Those, therefore, have made a better distinction who have called the third head δυνατόν (dynaton), which our countrymen term possibile, "possibility"; though our Latin term may seem uncouth, it is the only one to be found. 26. That these three considerations do not enter into every subject of deliberation is too evident to make it necessary for me to demonstrate. Yet by most writers the number is increased, for things are reckoned by them as general considerations which are but special objects for notice, since what is lawful, just, pious, equitable, and merciful (mansuetum, for so they interpret τὸ ἥμερον, (to hēmeron)) and whatever else may be added of a similar character, may be included under what is honorable. 27. Whether, again, a thing be easy, important, pleasant, or free from danger belongs to the consideration of expediency. These particular points for consideration arise from what is said in reply to us by our opponents: It is indeed expedient, but it is difficult, of little importance, unpleasant, and dangerous. 28. Yet some think that deliberation at times occurs merely concerning agreeableness, as when a consultation is held about the erection of a theater or the institution of games; but I do not suppose that any man is so totally given up to pleasure as to look for nothing but gratification in deliberation of a subject. 29. For there must always be something that should be thought of higher consideration: in regard to games, the honor of the gods; and in regard to the erection of a theatre, useful relaxation from labor, and the unbecoming and inconvenient contention for places among the crowd, if there should be no theater. Religion, at the same time, will have its place in the consideration, as we may call the theater a temple, as it were, for the festival solemnized there to the gods. 30. Often, too, we say that advantage is to be disregarded in order that we may do what is honorable (as when we counsel the people of Opitergium not to surrender themselves to the enemy, though they will perish unless they do so), and sometimes we may have occasion to set what is honorable below what is advantageous (as when we advise, as in the second Punic war, that the slaves should be armed). 31. But even in the latter case, we must not altogether admit that the proceeding is dishonorable (for we may say that all men are free by nature and are formed of the same matter, and that even some of the slaves may be descended from noble ancestors), and in the former case, when the danger is evident, other considerations may be alleged, as we may assert that if they surrender, they may perish even more cruelly, should the enemy, for instance, not keep their word, or should Caesar, as is more probable, obtain the superiority. 39. But considerations which are so much opposed to one another are frequently softened by some alteration in the words, for expediency itself is altogether set at nought by that sect who say not only that what is honorable is always preferable to what is expedient, but that nothing can even be expedient which is not honorable; on the other hand, what we call honorable, another sect calls vain, ostentatious, foolish, and more commendable in words than in reality. 33. Nor is what is advantageous compared only with what is disadvantageous, but things that are advantageous or disadvantageous are compared with one another, as when we try to determine, of two advantageous measures, which is the more advantageous, or of two that are disadvantageous, which is the less so. The difficulty may be still increased, for sometimes three subjects for deliberation may present themselves, as when Pompey deliberated whether he should betake himself to Parthia, or Africa, or Egypt. Thus it is not only inquired which of two courses is preferable, but which is the most eligible of three. 34. In questions of this kind, there will never occur any doubt as to a matter which is every way in our favor, for when there is no room for speaking against a measure, what motive can there be for hesitating about it? Thus every subject for deliberation is generally nothing else but a subject for comparison, and we must consider both what we would attain and by what means, so that we may form an estimate whether there is greater advantage in that which we pursue or greater disadvantage in the means by which we pursue it. 35. A question of advantage may also have reference to time: it is expedient, but not now; or to place: not here; or to persons: not for us, or against those; or to a particular mode of proceeding: not thus; or to measure: not to so great a degree. But still more frequently, we have to take persons into consideration with a view to what may be becoming, a point which is to be regarded in respect not only to ourselves but to those also who consult us. 36. Though examples are of the utmost effect in deliberative oratory, because men are most easily led to consent to any measure by instances of similar proceedings, it makes a great difference whose authority is adduced and to whom it is recommended, for the feelings of those who listen to deliberative speeches are various. 37. Our audience may be also of two kinds, for those who consult us are either many or single individuals, and as to each, distinctions are to be made, since, with regard to a number of persons, it makes a great difference whether they are a Senate, or a people, whether Romans, or Fidenates, whether Greeks, or Barbarians, and, in respect to individuals, whether we recommend that public offices should be sought by Cato or by Caius Marius, and whether Scipio the elder, or Fabius consult with us on the mode of conducting a war. 38. We must in like manner look to sex, dignity, and age. But it is the character of our hearers that should lead us to make the chief difference in our addresses to them. To recommend honorable measures to those who are honorable is extremely easy, but if we ever have occasion to enforce a right course of conduct on the unprincipled, we must be careful not to reproach them with the opposite nature of their life. 39. The minds of such an audience are to be influenced not by dissertations on the nature of virtue, for which they have no regard, but by allusions to honor and to the opinion of others, and if such arguments to their vanity do not move them, by showing the advantage likely to follow from what you advise, or rather perhaps, and with more effect, by showing them how much is to be dreaded if they act otherwise. 40. For besides the fact that minds of the lightest principles are most easily alarmed, I know not whether the fear of evil has not naturally more influence with the majority of mankind than the hope of good, to whom also the knowledge of what is vicious comes with greater facility than the knowledge of that which is virtuous. 41. Sometimes, also, actions which are scarcely honorable are recommended to the good, and to those of a rather opposite character are proposed measures in which nothing but the advantage of those who seek the advice is regarded. I am well aware what sort of reflection may at once occur to the reader of this passage. "Is this, then," he may ask, "the practice that you recommend, and do you think it right?" 42. Cicero might absolve me, when he writes in the following manner to Brutus (after mentioning many courses of conduct which might be fairly recommended to Caesar): "Should I act as an honest man, if I should recommend these measures? Certainly not, for the proper object of an adviser is the advantage of him whom he advises. But the measures are right. Who says otherwise? But in giving advice, there is not always room for what is right." As this question, however, is of a deeper nature and does not concern deliberative speeches only, the subject is reserved by me for my twelfth book, which will be my last. 43. I should not wish anything to be done dishonorably, and in the meantime, let these questions be considered to belong at least to the exercises of the schools, for the nature of what is bad should be known, that we may the better support what is good. 44. If any one, however, recommend to a good man anything not quite honorable, let him remember not to recommend it as dishonorable, in the manner in which some declaimers urge Sextus Pompey to engage in piracy, for the very reason that it is nefarious and cruel; but some palliation must be thrown over what is disgraceful, even in addressing the immoral. 45. It is in this way that Catiline speaks in Sallust, so that he seems to rush daringly into a heinous enterprise, not through want of regard for honesty, but through indignation. It is thus also that Atreus speaks in Varius: I now endure gross wickedness, and now How much more then is this pretension to honor to be maintained before those who have a real regard to their character! 46. Accordingly, if we advise Cicero to implore the mercy of Antony or even to burn his Philippics (supposing such to be the condition on which Antony offers him life), we shall not insist upon his love of life, (for if this has any influence on his mind, it will maintain that influence even though we remain silent), but we shall exhort him to preserve himself for the service of his country. 47. He will have occasion for such a pretext, that he may not be ashamed of his supplications to Antony. Or if we advise Caius Caesar to assume kingly power, we shall assert that the state cannot subsist but under the rule of one master, for he who deliberates about a criminal proceeding seeks only how he may appear to do as little wrong as possible. 48. It is of much importance, also, what the character of the adviser is, because if his previous life has been illustrious, or if the nobility of his birth, or his age or fortune, excites expectation, care must be taken that what he says may not be at variance with the dignity of him who says it. But a character of a contrary nature requires a humbler tone, for what is liberty in some is in others called presumption; to some their authority is sufficient support, while the force of reason itself scarcely upholds others. 49. In consequence prosopopeiae appear to me the most difficult of all speeches of this kind, for in them the task of sustaining a character is added to the other arduous points of suasory eloquence. Caesar, Cicero, and Cato, speaking on the same subject, must each express himself differently. But exercise in this department is extremely beneficial, both because it requires double effort and because it greatly improves the powers of those who would be poets or historians. 50. To orators, it is even indispensable, for there are many speeches composed by Greek and Latin orators for others to use, and what was expressed in these had to be adapted to the speaker's condition and character. Did Cicero think uniformly in the same manner or assume the same character when he wrote for Cneius Pompey, for Titus Ampius, and for others? Did he not rather, looking to the fortune, dignity, and actions of each of them, express the very character of all to whom he gave words, so that, though they spoke in a better style than their own, they yet appeared to speak in their own persons? 51. A speech is not less faulty which is unsuited to the person than that which is unsuited to the subject to which it ought to be adapted. Lysias, accordingly, is thought to deserve great praise for preserving so exact an air of truth in the speeches which he wrote for the illiterate. It ought, indeed, to be a chief object with declaimers to consider what is suitable to different characters, for they speak on but few subjects of controversy as advocates, but generally harangue in the character of sons, fathers, rich men, old men, morose or good-natured persons, misers or superstitious people, cowards or jesters, so that actors in comedy have scarcely more parts to master on the stage than they have in the schools. 52. All these representations of characters may be regarded as prosopopeiae, which I include under deliberative orations because they differ from them in nothing but the personation of a character, though this is sometimes introduced into those deliberative subjects, which, taken from history, are conducted under the real names of the speakers. 53. Nor am I ignorant that poetical and historical prosopopeiae are sometimes given in the schools by way of exercise, as the pleading of Priam before Achilles, or the address of Sylla to the people on laying down the dictatorship. But these will fall under some of the three heads into which I have divided causes, for we have to intreat, to make declarations, to give reasons, and to do other things of which I have spoken above, in various forms and as the subject may require, in the judicial, deliberative, and demonstrative kind of oratory. 54. But in all these we very often utter fictitious speeches attributed to characters which we ourselves introduce; as in Cicero's speech Pro Caelio, Appius Caecus and Clodius, the brother of Clodia, are both represented as addressing Clodia, the former being made to reproach her with her intrigues, and the other to admonish her about them. 55. Matters for debate, too, are often introduced in the schools, which approach nearer to the judicial than the deliberative kind of oratory, and which are indeed compounded of the two, as when a discussion is held before Caesar about the punishment of Theodotus, for it consists of an accusation and a defense, which are the proper parts of judicial pleadings. 56. But the question of expediency also enters into it: it is inquired "whether it was to the advantage of Caesar that Pompey was killed; whether war is to be apprehended from the king if Theodotus be put to death; and whether such war would not be embarrassing and dangerous at the present time and likely to be of long duration." 57. Considerations also arise about the honorableness of the proceeding: "as whether it would be becoming in Caesar to avenge Pompey, and whether it was to be apprehended that he would injure the cause of his party, if he should confess that Pompey was undeserving of death." 58. Deliberations on such questions may occur even in real causes. There has, however, prevailed among most declaimers in regard to deliberative speeches, an error that has not been without its consequences, for they have imagined that the deliberative style of speaking is different from the judicial, and indeed altogether opposed to it. Accordingly, they have affected abrupt commencements, a kind of oratory always vehement, and a liberal embellishment, as they call it, in their expressions, and have studied to make shorter notes, forsooth, for deliberative than for judicial subjects. 59. For my part, though I do not see that there is any need for a regular exordium in deliberative speeches for the reasons which I have previously stated, I still do not understand why we should commence with furious exclamation, for he who is asked his opinion on a question proposed does not, if he is a man of sense, begin immediately to cry out, but endeavors to gain the confidence of those who consult him by a modest and rational entrance on the subject. 60. Or why should the style of the speaker be like a torrent and uniformly vehement, when counsel requires in the most eminent degree moderation and calm reasoning? I admit that in judicial pleadings, the tone of the speaker is often lowered in the exordium, the statement of facts, and the argumentative portions, and that, if you take away these three parts, there will remain something like the substance of which deliberative orations consist, but that substance ought to be more calm, not more violent and furious. 61. As to grandeur of diction, it is not to be affected by those who declaim deliberative speeches more than by others, but it comes more naturally to them, for to those who imagine their own subjects, great personages—such as kings, princes, people, and Senate—are generally most attractive with important topics for discussion, and consequently, when the style is suited to the matter, it assumes a degree of magnificence from it. 62. With regard to real causes, the case is different, and therefore Theophrastus has pronounced that the language in all deliberative oratory should be free from every kind of affectation, following in this respect the authority of his master, though he does not hesitate frequently to differ from him. 63. For Aristotle was of opinion that the panegyrical department of oratory was the best adapted for improvement in composition, and next to it the judicial, since the first is devoted wholly to display, and the latter requires art so as even to deceive the hearers if expediency demands; but counsel needs nothing but truth and prudence. 64. With respect to panegyric, I agree with these critics, for all other writers have expressed themselves of a similar opinion, but in judicial and deliberative subjects, I think that the manner of speaking is to be adapted to the matter, according to the nature of the question that may be under consideration. 65. I see that the Philippics of Demosthenes are distinguished by the same merits as the speeches which he pronounced in judicial causes, and the opinions of Cicero delivered in the Senate and his speeches to the people exhibit a splendor of eloquence no less luminous than that which appears in his accusations and defenses. Yet he speaks of the deliberative kind of oratory in this way: the language ought to be uniformly simple and grave, and more distinguished for studied thoughts than for studied phraseology. 66. That there is no kind of oratory to which the application of examples is more suitable, all writers are justly agreed, as the future seems for the most part to correspond to the past, and experience is regarded as some attestation to reason. 67. As to shortness or length in such speeches, it depends not on the nature of the subject, but on the compass of it, for as in deliberations, the question is generally more simple, so in judicial affairs it is often of less extent. All these remarks will prove true to anyone who shall prefer, instead of growing grey over the treatises of the rhetoricians, to read not only speeches, but also histories, for in history the orations pronounced to the people, and the opinions delivered in councils of state, generally afford examples of persuasion and dissuasion. 68. He will find, too, that in deliberative speeches the commencements are not abrupt; that the diction in judicial pleadings is often more animated; that style is suited to the matter in one class as well as in the other; and that the speeches in courts of justice are sometimes shorter than those in public councils. 69. Nor will he find in them the faults into which some of our declaimers fall, who indulge in coarse invectives against those that dissent in opinion from them, and speak, on the whole, as if they were the natural adversaries of those who ask their advice, and thus exhibit themselves in the character rather of railers than of counsellors. 70. Let young men know that these remarks are written for their admonition, that they may not allow themselves to be taught otherwise than they will have to speak, and spend their time upon learning that which they will have to unlearn. But whenever they shall be called to give counsel to their friends, to pronounce an opinion in the senate, or to offer advice if the emperor consult them, they will be taught by practice what they cannot perhaps receive on the credit of precepts.
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